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ABSTRACT
Psychologists involved in the treatment of chronic pain have increasingly
emphasised the importance of cognitive factors in the development and maintenance
of chronic pain (Turk and Rudy, 1992). Most pain management programmes (PMP's)
incorporate a cognitive-behavioural component that, for example, teaches patients to
identify thoughts the might lower mood, exacerbate their pain or interfere with their
ability to engage in rehabilitative behaviours. These treatment elements are derived
from the cognitive model of depression (Beck, 1967), which states that depressed
mood is maintained by negative automatic thoughts that arise out of the patient's
dysfunctional schemata. Schemata are cognitive structures that organise our beliefs,
attitudes and assumptions, and help the individual to construe themselves and their
world. Whilst there has been some research suggesting that dysfunctional schemata
(those thought to be associated with poor psychological adjustment) can interfere
with outcome in cognitive-behavioural therapy for depression (Jarrett, Eaves,
Granneman and Rush, 1991) no similar research has been conducted examining their
influence on outcome from a PMP.
In this study, 66 patients, who were attending six consecutive pain management
groups, were asked to complete two measures of dysfunctional schemata (the
Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale, Weissman, 1979 and the Young Schema
Questionnaire - Short Form, Young and Brown, 1999). These measures were
supplemented by two sets of informant ratings (provided by a close friend or relative
and by the psychologist leading the PMP) of the patient's schemata. Outcome
measures used to assess the effectiveness of the PMP included current pain intensity,
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self-reported mood disturbance, self-efficacy, readiness to engage in pain
management, disability, and physiotherapist ratings of functional ability. These were
collected at the beginning and at the end of treatment. The number of significant
associations between the measures of dysfunctional schemata and patient outcomes
(the difference between pre and post-treatment scores) were few and were often in
the direction opposite to that predicted. Various substantive and methodological
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1.1 The problem of chronic pain.
Chronic pain is a very widespread problem. A recent World Health Organisation
survey (Gureje, Von Korff, Simon, & Grate, 1998) conducted across five continents,
reported that 22 per cent of the nearly 26,000 respondents who were surveyed
reported that they had suffered persistent pain sometime over the last year. A recent
review of the prevalence of 'chronic benign pain' (which is pain of unknown organic
explanation, also known as 'idiopathic pain'; 'pain of unknown physiological origin';
and 'somatoform pain') found a median prevalence, across 15 studies, of fifteen per
cent (Verhaak, Kerssens, Dekker, Sorbi and Bensing, 1998). Many of the patients in
these studies may have, at some time or another, been identified by their physicians
as suffering from some form of underlying physiological pathology.
Such problems, as well as being widespread and causing a great deal of distress and
disruption to the lives of sufferers, are also extremely costly. One study (Maniadkis
and Gray, 2000) of the economic costs of back pain (the most common site for
chronic benign pain) to the economy of the United Kingdom produced some startling
figures. The direct costs of back pain (comprising hospital visits, private treatments,
prescription drugs, and medical investigations) were calculated at £1632 million in
the year of 1998. This figure, however, was dwarfed by total costs, which took
account of such things as informal care and lost production, which they estimated
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produced an annual bill of £10668 million. Clearly, chronic benign pain is worthy of
attention.
There have been numerous attempts to produce a classification system for describing
the chronic pain population, but this has been hampered by confusion over the extent
to which symptom variation between patients can be attributed to specific
pathological processes. The purposes of producing such a diagnostic system is that it
should indicate which groups are appropriate for which forms of treatment
approaches and it should also predict outcomes from treatment for different kinds of
chronic pain patients. The most extensive classification system to date is that
produced by the International Association for the Study of Pain (IASP, 1986). This is
now in its second edition (Merskey and Bogduk, 1994) and identifies over 600 pain
syndromes. However, even this elaborate system has been criticised for focusing on
pain site as the primary organising factor as it is felt that such an approach is likely to
lead to heterogeneous groupings of patients. This concern about groups of pain
patients being treated as homogeneous runs throughout the modern literature on pain.
However, even the most modern of books is organised by using pain site as a
classification system. Typically, such books will have chapters headed, 'phantom
limb pain', 'migraine and headache', 'neck pain', 'low back pain', and so forth (see,
Crombie, Croft, Linton, LeResche and von Korf, 1999, as an example).
Pain has been defined as "an unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated
with actual or potential tissue damage or described in terms of such damage" (The
International Association for the Study of Pain, Subcommittee on Taxonomy, 1986).
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Because pain is a sensory and emotional experience, it is, essentially, a subjective
experience. Furthermore, this truism, along with the fact that tissue damage does not
always have to be present for pain to be felt, ensures that any measurement and
classification system is likely to be problematic. Furthermore, it is widely accepted
that chronic pain is a multi-dimensional phenomenon, comprising sensory
experiences, associated suffering or emotional distress and a variety of'pain
behaviours' (Crombie and Davies, 1999).
1.2 Models of chronic pain
The following sections go on to describe the various models that have been used to
attempt to understand chronic pain. Because of the variation across pain patients, in
terms of their underlying pathology, their personal histories and their psychological
make-up, these models may provide explanations for some groups but not for all.
Therefore, it is not intended that these models be seen as competing with one another
(although when viewed historically this can be seen as often having been the case).
Rather each approach may prove informative regarding the experiences of particular
groups of pain patients. In rough terms, these models can be divided into those that
centre around physiological, behavioural (including learning theory), cognitive,
characterological, and social explanations.
1.2.1 Physiological models
Early models of pain regarded it as a purely physiological phenomenon, with pain
being an automatic response to a painful stimulus. Descartes suggested that there was
a direct pathway from this stimulus to specific areas of the brain that registered the
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painful sensation. These ideas were further developed by Von Frey (1895) who
postulated specific sensory receptors for different sensations, such as heat, touch and
pain. Then, in 1920, Goldschneider developed a model of pain called the 'pattern
theory' that suggested that specific patterns of nerve impulses produced different
types of sensations, including pain. These early physiological models all have similar
characteristics in that they exclude psychological influences on pain and see pain as
an automatic response to physical stimulation.
It was the development of the 'gate control theory of pain' (GCT) by Melzack and
Wall (1965) that central nervous system processes were made central to the
understanding of pain. The gate control theory integrates psychological and
physiological processes through the means of a 'gate'. This gate mechanism is
thought to comprise a group of cells located in the dorsal horns of the spinal column.
This mechanism is hypothesised to receive input from the site of injury through
peripheral nerve fibres that synapse here. Most importantly, the 'gate' also receives
input from the brain via descending neural pathways. These 'top-down' inputs contain
information about the organism's current behaviour (including attention), emotional
state (for example, the level of anxiety), and past experiences (for example,
memories of pain and injury) and are thought to act in both an excitatory and
inhibitory fashion. The gating mechanism is believed to sum up these inputs with the
strength of the summated signal determining whether or not this is transmitted past
the gate and into areas of the brain which would register a painful sensation. Whilst
the gate control theory has had a huge influence on pain research it has been
criticised for being too general, and fails to specify with sufficient precision the
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interactions that it proposes take place (Price, 1988). Another criticism is that it has
proven difficult to identify a physiological structure that acts in the gate-like fashion
that is proposed by the model (Nathan and Rudge, 1974). Others, like Sunderland
(1978), argue that the theory fails to account for certain conditions, such as causalgia
(a severe burning pain). The model has undergone a number of revisions (Melzack,
1993; Melzack and Wall, 1989) in an attempt to tackle some of these criticisms.
Regardless of whatever problems remain with the model, it is still viewed as being
the most influential working theory that is used by modern pain researchers
(Skevington, 1995).
Recent developments in neurophysiology have extended our understanding of
biological processes in chronic pain. Essentially these physiological models have
examined long-term changes in the nervous system. These studies have demonstrated
that peripheral and central nerve functioning is 'plastic', and can be altered as a
consequence of repeated environmental exposure. In one of the earliest
demonstrations of neurological plasticity Dubner and Ruda (1992) showed that,
immediately following an injury, the surrounding area can become highly sensitive
to stimuli that were previously innocuous (such as mild variations in touch and
temperature). The hypothesised physiological mechanisms in this case are thought to
be excitatory toxic effects of amino acids altering spinal cord function. In a review of
neuropathic pain Woolf and Mannion (1999) distinguish between spontaneous (or
stimulus independent) pain and pain hypersensitivity resulting from damage to, or
changes within, neural pathways.
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Other models, however, have focused exclusively on psychological factors.
1.2.2 Behavioural models
Perhaps the most well known behavioural model is the one proposed by Fordyce
(1976). According to Fordyce, pain can not be observed directly and the only
information we can gain from another person about their pain is that which they
communicate to us. These communications can either be verbal or non-verbal.
Furthermore, like any other form of behaviour they are capable of eliciting responses
that may in turn be reinforcing and increase the likelihood of the behaviour being
produced again. Clearly, such a theory provides a set of processes that could
theoretically be capable of causing pain behaviours to become long-lived. More
detail about the theorised processes involved in this model is given in Fordye (1982).
According to this model pain behaviour can occur for one of two reasons. The first is
a response to a nociceptive stimulus, which Fordyce (1982) suggests is a respondent
or reflexive behaviour. The alternative is that pain behaviour can occur because of
conditioning effects. Fie suggests that in the traditional case, pain behaviours
originate as a consequence of injury. However, these if these pain behaviours persist,
they do so in an environment which contains conditioning effects. Therefore, pain
behaviours may occur long past the time taken for any injury to heal.
Fordyce (1982) cites a number of studies as evidence for these processes. In one
study Fordyce, Cauldwell and Hongadarom (1979) measured the amount of effort
that patients with chronic pain could tolerate. This experiment had two conditions.
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Both of the conditions involved patients turning the wheel of the exercise bike in
order to keep a bulb, which was suspended above their heads, lit. In the first
condition the subjects were denied feedback on the effort they were making as the
apparatus was rigged in such a way as to constantly vary the effort required to keep
the bulb lit. In the second condition, the apparatus was held constant, so that the
patients were given accurate feedback about the effort that they had expended. What
was interesting about this experiment was that the subjects who were denied
feedback were able to tolerate effort at much higher levels than were those who were
given accurate feedback. Fordyce (1982) suggests that this experiment demonstrated
that exercise 'tolerance' in chronic pain patients critically depends on factors other
than some simple nociceptive feedback.
Other experiments that Fordyce (1982) cites to support his model include a study by
Block, Kramer and Gaylor (1980) where the pain behaviours elicited by chronic pain
patients in an interview situation were measured. The patients were divided into two
groups. One group consisted of patients who reported that their spouses acted in
supportive ways when they were in pain. The other group comprised patients who
said their spouses were unsupportive. The experimental situation involved giving the
patients (accurate) feedback on whether they were being observed by their spouses or
a medical professional from behind a one-way mirror. At the mid-point of the
interview the patients were asked to give a rating of their current level of pain. The
results demonstrated a two-way interaction between patient group and whether their
spouse or the health professional was observing. The pain ratings given by both
groups of patients were similar when being observed by the health professional but
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were significantly higher in the supportive spouse group when they were told that
their spouse was observing. This study suggests that social feedback is important in
determining what patients say about the severity of their pain. A study conducted by
Cairns and Pasino (1977) further demonstrated that exercise performance and
tolerance can be determined by social feedback. In this study, the performance of
nine chronic pain patients on two separate tasks, riding an exercise bicycle and
walking laps of a track, were measured. On both tasks, the patients' performance was
either praised or responded to neutrally by the physical therapist accompanying
them. Inspection of the patients' performance levels revealed that this was higher
when their activity was being praised. All of these experiments suggest that pain
behaviours can be systematically controlled by environmental influences.
Fordyce (1982) suggests that the process of reinforcement described above can easily
explain a variety of behaviours that are typical of patients with chronic pain. For
example, medication that is given on an 'as required' basis requires the patient to
indicate suffering before the medication is given out. Fordyce (1982) argues that if
the analgesic has a positively reinforcing value for the person then, in behavioural
terms, a conditioning arrangement has been set up whereby the medication regime
strengthens the probability that the person will indicate suffering and continue to ask
for analgesia. A similar example can be seen when patients are encouraged to stop an
activity when it becomes painful. Such instructions make rest contingent on pain
behaviours. If this rest is reinforcing for the person, then a conditioning arrangement
has been set up that may serve to strengthen pain behaviour. The studies by Block
and colleagues (1980) and by Cairns and Pasino (1977) described earlier, illustrate
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how the behaviour of family, friends and health professionals have the potential to
increase and maintain pain behaviours. As well as positive reinforcement
perpetuating pain behaviours, Fordyce (1982) argues that avoidance learning can also
play a part in the amount of functional limitation displayed by patients with chronic
pain. One example of this kind of learning has been termed 'secondary gain'. This is
where patients learn that when they have pain (or emit pain behaviours) they avoid
aversive events. Classic examples of such learned avoidance may include situations
where pain behaviours allow difficult circumstances at work or in social and family
relations to be avoided.
This model has been hugely influential in the development of the understanding and
treatment of chronic pain. Many modern interventions with chronic pain patients
contain elements of this behavioural model.
1.2.3 Cognitive models
Cognitive factors have been postulated to intervene in many ways in the
development and maintenance of chronic pain states. The particular cognitive
processes that have been examined have included pain perception (although this
work has been more relevant to acute, rather than chronic pain), beliefs, appraisals,
expectations, coping and memory. Turk and Rudy (1992) provide a review of
cognitive factors in chronic pain. In this review they organise these factors into
schema (actually labelled 'beliefs, appraisals and expectations'), cognitive processes,
and cognitive content. However, an examination of these categories suggests a large
degree of conceptual overlap and one major omission. The cognitive factors
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contained in the category that they label 'beliefs, appraisals and expectations' are
straightforward enough. This category includes beliefs about the seriousness of the
injury and further vulnerability to harm, self-efficacy, and learned helplessness
(however, it does not include beliefs about the appropriateness of self-management
approaches). The category of cognitive processes contains sets of thinking
distortions, errors, or biases that pain patients are thought to display. The list of
cognitive distortions given by Turk and Rudy (1992) essentially comprises those
suggested by Beck (1976) as playing a causal role in depression. However, Beck
(1976) is very clear that these types of thinking errors spring from sets of beliefs
(schema) that are established through early experiences. Consequently, it seems
rather artificial to separate cognitive distortions from schema as Beck's theory
suggests that the former spring from the latter. The final set of cognitive factors
outlined by Turk and Rudy consisted of "..the ongoing thoughts and coping strategies
used by chronic pain patients" (Turk and Rudy, 1992, p. 110). Turk and Rudy (1992)
suggest that these types of thoughts can be separated from the other two types
because they are generated 'at the time ofexperiencing pain' (my italics). However,
included in this list of the types of thoughts are catastrophising and helplessness,
both of which appear under the other two categories of thought types. This
distinction, which appears to be made solely on the basis of the timing of these
thoughts, does not seem a particularly valid one, particularly as these beliefs and
thinking biases are portrayed in other parts of their review as stable characteristics of
the pain patient's thought processes. Given these concerns about the validity of the
categories of cognitive factors used by Turk and Rudy, this review this will keep all
three sets together under the single heading of'cognitive content'.
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The major omission in Turk and Rudy's (1992) review is that research into cognitive
factors that are, indisputably, distortions in cognitive processes, are absent. In
particular, there is a substantial body of evidence examining biases in attentional and
memory processes that are thought to affect the experiences of chronic pain patients
in ways that are theorised as totally separate from the effects of the specifics of
cognitive content. Therefore, this review of cognitive factors in chronic pain will
cover just two categories. These will be labelled 'cognitive content' and 'cognitive
processes', with the latter concerned with biases in attentional and memory
processes.
Schema/Cognitive content
This perspective views pain patients, like everybody else, as processors of
information. The processing of this information is guided, or biased, by the patient's
beliefs, appraisals and expectancies. The sets of beliefs that are relevant to the
patient's pain and disability concern those surrounding their pain, their ability to
cope, their social supports, their underlying pathology, the medico-legal system, their
work and their employer's attitudes. Cioffi (1991) argues that, when confronted with
a new illness, patients will try to understand what is happening to them, how they
will be affected by it, and the likely prognosis. He calls this process of trying to
understand a 'meaning analysis'. As part of this analysis, patients will use their
schema to see whether or not important parts of their old experiences can be matched
up with the world that they find themselves in currently. In terms of the development
of chronic pain, the first stage in this process would involve the individual
11
interpreting, labelling and acting upon the physical sensations (in this case, their
pain) that they are experiencing. Once these sensations have been labelled as pain,
then other belief structures (for example, 'what is causing this?', 'does this mean I am
damaged?') would follow. From this process an elaborate mental model of the
patient's physical state is built, and this model may then determine the patient's
perception of their ability to cope and lead to the planning of further actions (Turk,
Rudy and Salovey, 1986). The example cited by Turk and Rudy (1992) is of a patient
who has a set of cognitive schema which suggests to them that they have a very
serious condition, that impairment naturally follows from pain, and that activity
undertaken when in pain is dangerous. They suggest that it is understandable and
predictable that a pattern of rest, dependency, and avoidance ofwork and other
activity may follow.
There are five sets of schema that have been most studied in relation to chronic pain.
These are, self-efficacy, fear of (re-)injury, catastrophising, helplessness and
readiness to accept a self-management approach to chronic pain. Each of these will
be dealt with in turn.
Self-efficacy is defined as "...a personal conviction that that one can successfully
execute a course of action to produce a certain outcome." (Turk and Rudy, 1992,
pl06). Bandura (1977) suggested that, along with motivation, self-efficacy beliefs
determine which specific goal-directed behaviour is selected, how long this
behaviour is persisted with, and whether or not an individual continues when faced
with obstacles to achieving that goal. A number of studies have found that self-
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efficacy beliefs play a part in the rehabilitation efforts made by pain patients (For a
review see Turk and Rudy, 1991). An example of a study that employed a measure of
self-efficacy beliefs is the one conducted by Council, Ahern, Follick and Kline
(1988). These authors reported that, out of a suite ofmeasures, self-efficacy ratings
were the best predictor of the physical performance of back pain patients. The
authors went on to suggest that these self-efficacy ratings were themselves
determined by the extent to which patients anticipated that physical activity would
lead to an increase in their pain and further disability (see below for more
information on the relevance of fear avoidance and anxiety). These results have also
been replicated in a more recent study (Buckelow, Murray, Hewett, Johnson and
Huyser, 1994).
As well as appearing to be a stable finding, there is also some evidence from an
impressive longitudinal study supporting the notion that these efficacy beliefs play a
causal role in the well-being of patients with chronic pain. Keefe, Affleck, Lefebvre,
Starr, Caldwell, and Tennen (1997) examined daily diaries from 53 patients with
rheumatoid arthritis. Time lagged analyses revealed that self-efficacy scores on one
day predicted pain intensity and mood ratings on the following day.
Fear of (re-)injury, or fear avoidance as it is sometimes called, is of great conceptual
interest. Fordyce's behavioural model of chronic pain would suggest that if
unpleasant activities are avoided then this behaviour will be maintained by a process
of negative reinforcement involving the reduction of the patient's anxiety. Turk
(1996) has suggested that this conditioned fear may generalise to a variety of
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different situations, such as work, sexual activity and leisure. This avoidance often
leads to a loss ofmobility, muscle strength, and fitness (Bortz, 1984). This whole
process is essentially self-defeating for the patient who avoids activities to reduce
their pain. This is because the loss of physical condition increases the likelihood of
pain resulting from muscle or ligament strain when an unfit body is asked to perform
activities that it has become unused to performing.
The use of this concept in understanding chronic pain has been furthered by the
recent parallel development of two self-report measures of this construct. The Pain
Anxiety Symptoms Scale (PASS: McCracken, Zayfert and Gross, 1992) is a 53 item
scale that seeks to measure fear of pain. Validation of the scale was conducted by a
series of regression analyses where the ability of the scale to predict disability in
chronic pain patients after controlling for anxiety, depression, and a measure of pain
intensity. In each of these analyses, the PASS contributed significantly to variance in
the disability score. A more recent study, using a series of step-wise regression
analyses, found that various sub-scales of the PASS predicted pain severity,
disability, pain complaints and help-seeking behaviours (McCracken, Gross, Aiken,
and Carnrike, 1996).
The Tampa Scale for Kinesiophobia (TSK: Kori, Miller, and Todd, 1990) is a similar
instrument. It contains 17 items that measure fear of physical movement because of a
sense of vulnerability to painful injury or re-injury. Validation studies have shown
that low back pain patients who score highly on the TSK are less likely to persist
with a task that consisted of lifting a 5.5kg bag (Vlaeyen, Kole-Snijders, Boeren and
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van Eek, 1995). Another study (Vlaeyan, Kole-Snijders, Rotteveel, Ruesink and
Heuts, 1995) found that the TSK was significantly correlated with measures of
disability, pain intensity, pain duration, and a self-report instrument that measured
catastrophic thinking (see below for more detail on this concept). The same study
also employed a regression analysis, which demonstrated that the TSK was a
significant predictor of self-reported disability after pain duration was controlled for.
Such findings raise the question as to whether these fears develop as a response to
living with chronic back pain or whether they play a causal role in the development
of chronicity. One interesting study suggests that the latter explanation is more
likely. Klenerman, Slade, Stanley, Pennie, Reilly, Atchison, Troup and Rose, (1995)
collected psychological and biomedical measures from a group of 300 patients with
acute back pain. When these patients were followed up, they found that fear of pain
measured at the time of assessment was the best predictor of continuing low back
pain one year later. The implications of these findings for the necessity of early
educational intervention in acute back pain are obvious.
Catastrophising is one of the cognitive biases or 'thinking errors' (along with
'arbitrary inference', 'selective abstraction', 'overgeneralisation',
'magnification/minimisation', 'personalising' and 'mind-reading') identified by Beck
and his associates that are thought to maintain the negative beliefs and appraisals that
underlie many psychological disorders (Beck, Rush, Shaw and Emery, 1979). It is
defined as "dwelling on the worst possible outcome of a situation and overestimating
the probability that it will occur" (Wells, 1997, p.8). Although there have been a
number of investigations of these 'thinking errors' in the chronic pain population,
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catastrophising has become to be regarded as the most important (Turk and Rudy,
1992). This is because, in this group, it has been found to be linked to depression
(Lefebvre, 1981), disability (Smith, Follick, Ahern and Adams, 1986), and pain
intensity (Flor and Turk, 1988) even when disease variables are controlled for. As
with all of these cognitive variables, the direction of cause (from cognition to pain or
vice versa) has been difficult to ascertain because of a lack of longitudinal studies.
Turk and Rudy (1992) make the point that cognitive-behavioural treatment
approaches target these cognitions because they view cognitions as causally related
to pain chronicity. They go on to suggest that, if this theory is correct, the degree to
which these cognitions are changed during treatment should be associated with
variation in therapeutic outcome. Reassuringly, several studies have found that
changes in cognition corresponded with changes in measures of pain, dysphoric
mood, and disability (O'Leary, Shoor, Lorig & Holman, 1988; Parker, Smarr,
Buesher, Philips, Frank, Beck, Anderson and Walker, 1989). Flowever, longitudinal
studies that show that catastrophising is linked to the development of chronic pain
are still required.
Learned helplessness (Seligman, 1975) refers to a belief that no solutions are
available to reduce the current experience of distress. With the inclusion of
attribution theory, this concept was developed further into what was known as the
reformulated helplessness theory (Abramson, Seligman and Teasdale, 1978).
Hopelessness theory broadened these ideas further still by including beliefs about the
extent to which aversive events are unavoidable and are predictive of future
uncontrollable events (Abramson, Metalsky and Alloy, 1979). The theoretical
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relevance of these ideas to an understanding of pain is that those in chronic pain may
come to believe that the onset and the intensity of their pain is uncontrollable, likely
to interfere with the whole of their lives, and that these problems are likely to be
unending. Some research has suggested that this attributional style ia a cause of
depression (Metalsky & Joiner, 1992). However, others contend that the strength of
these beliefs is more likely to be a consequence, rather than a cause, of depression
(Brewin, 1986). Skevington (1995) reviewed the evidence for the role of helplessness
beliefs as the cause ofmood disorder in chronic pain patients and concluded that this
could best be described as limited and qualified.
The final set of schematic processes that have been investigated in chronic pain are
various beliefs about the appropriateness of a self-management approach. Such
beliefs may include a strong opinion that only medical intervention can help or that
self-management is likely to be ineffective in treating their pain. These sets of beliefs
have been integrated into a model that is thought to reflect the stages that individuals
go through in changing their behaviour. The transtheoretical model of behaviour
change (Prochaska and DiClemente, 1984) proposes that individuals progress
through five stages when changing their behaviour. These stages are generally
labelled, precontemplation (the stage where the individual has little interest in
changing their behaviour), contemplation (the point when the individual reports
interest in change), preparation (when the individual actively considers how to
change), action (the stage when individuals start to change their behaviour) and
maintenance (the stage where the individual works to maintain the change in their
behaviour). This model proposes that for behaviour change to be successful, the
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content of interventions should be matched to the target person's stage in the
behavioural change process. Failure to do so, it is argued, risks the intervention
failing.
A self-report measure of these stages of change cognitions has been developed for
use in chronic pain populations. The Pain Stages of Change Questionnaire (PSOCQ:
Kerns, Rosenberg, Jamison, Caudill and Haythornwhite, 1997) was developed to
measure four of the above five stages. The reason that there are only four, rather than
five stages, is that the results of a confirmatory factor analysis suggested that the
stages labelled 'preparation' and 'contemplation could not be separated empirically
and the PSOCQ therefore combines these into a single sub-scale. These four stages
are represented as sub-scales of the PCOSQ. Validation of the PSOCQ was
conducted in two stages. The first examined the correlation matrix of four sub-scales.
This revealed that the pre-contemplation sub-scale was correlated inversely with the
other three sub-scales, whilst the contemplation, change, and maintenance sub-scales
all correlated positively with each other. These results are in line with the theoretical
model. External validation of the scale was conducted by examining the relationship
between the four sub-scales and a variety of criterion measures. These criterion
measures included two sub-scales from the Survey of Pain Attitudes (Jensen, Turner,
Romano and Lawler, 1994), one of which concerned the pain patient's belief in a
medical cure whilst the other addressed the extent to which patients believed they
had control over their pain. The pattern of correlation coefficients was broadly
supportive of the PSOCQ model, with, for example, pre-contemplation being related
positively to a belief in a medical cure and negatively with the patients' belief that
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they had control over their pain. When measures of active and passive coping were
examined in relation to the PSOCQ sub-scales, the pattern of correlation coefficients
was also in the directions predicted by the model. Essentially, active coping showed
an inverse relationship to pre-contemplation and was related positively to the other
sub-scales, whilst the relationships between passive coping and the PSOCQ sub-
scales were in opposite directions. The strongest test of the utility of this concept
would naturally be whether or not it predicted patient responses to a self-
management treatment approach. This test was conducted in a recent paper. Kerns
and Rosenberg (2000) used the PSOCQ responses from chronic pain patients to
predict outcome from a cognitive behavioural group therapy programme that
emphasised a self-management approach. The results of this analysis can be
described as mixed. Whilst pre-treatment PSOCQ scores did not predict treatment
changes in a variety of outcomes (including, pain severity, disability, pain behaviours
and mood ratings) changes in PSOCQ scores were related to some treatment effects.
Those patients whose pre-contemplation scores increased during the group
programme also showed increases in pain severity, disability and depression scores.
Furthermore, those patients whose action and maintenance scores increased
following the group treatment showed reductions in depression ratings. Another
interesting finding was that the PSOCQ score profiles predicted which patients
dropped out of treatment. Although many of the other correlation coefficients failed
to reach statistical significance, most of these were in the direction predicted by the




Cognitive processes, in this context, refer to the manipulation of information. The
specific processes that have been studied in relation to chronic pain have included
attention and memory. Researchers have been interested in the ways in which these
systems may be operating with a variety of biases, and the role that these may
potentially have in maintaining chronic pain and accompanying low mood. This
work has followed on from a more general investigation of information processing
biases in clinical disorders, which has become increasingly popular (Williams, Watts,
MacLeod and Mathews, 1997).
As regards attention, investigators have sought to establish whether patients with
chronic pain syndromes process pain-related information differently from normal
controls. The reasoning behind such an approach is that such biases may increase
patient distress and may be responsible for maintaining the pain experience. This
reasoning is in turn based on the oft-repeated finding that attending to painful stimuli
(most often in laboratory based tasks) increases pain intensity and lowers pain
tolerance thresholds. Indeed, cognitive coping strategies that involve distraction have
been shown in one meta-analysis (Fernandez and Turk, 1989) to enhance pain
tolerance.
The most commonly used paradigm to investigate attentional biases is a modified
form of the Stroop colour-naming task (Stroop, 1935). The theory behind this
method is that the emotional content of some words (in the case of this clinical
group, the words would be related to pain in some way) would interfere with the
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colour-naming task, causing a greater number of errors and longer response latencies.
Using this paradigm, Pearce and Morley (1989) found that chronic pain patients
demonstrated greater interference on pain-related sensory and affective words when
compared to pain-free controls. However, other researchers have failed to find
attentional biases (Herbert, 1992), whilst those that have replicated the Pearce and
Morley study have suggested that longer response latencies may simply be a
consequence of the high levels of depression among pain patients (Boissevan, 1994).
Pincus, Fraser and Pearce (1998), in a carefully conducted set of experiments,
demonstrated that attentional biases in chronic pain patients arise out of anxious and
depressed mood, and could not simply be ascribed to their pain patient status.
The evidence for memory biases in chronic pain patients, on the other hand, is much
stronger and less equivocal. This work is based on the theoretical understanding of
the role ofmemory in depression (Bower, 1981; Teasdale, 1983), and is derived from
'spreading activation theory' (Collins and Loftus, 1975). This theory proposes that
emotional states are located in memory on what have been described as emotion
'nodes'. These nodes, when they are presented with the appropriate stimuli, are
activated, causing memories to enter conscious awareness. Work with clinically
depressed individuals, and with normal subjects in whom depressed mood has been
induced, has shown that low mood is associated with a bias for recalling negative
material and/or an opposing bias for reduced recall of positive material. These
processes are known as 'mood state dependent recall' (Bower, 1981). Becks's
cognitive theory of depression (Beck, 1976; Beck, et ah, 1979) places great emphasis
on the role of recurrent negative thinking as a cause of depression. These
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experimental findings show one route by which the predominance of negative (or
lack of positive) memories may occur. In a similar vein, Pearce, Isherwood, Hrouda,
Richardon, Erskine and Skinner (1990), proposed that pain patients have a recall bias
for pain related material. Using a mixed list of pain, negative and neutral words,
Pearce and her colleagues found that, at both immediate and delayed recall, pain
patients recalled more pain-related words and fewer negative and neutral words than
did normal controls. Other researchers have found similar results (e.g. Wright and
Morley, 1995). Importantly, these biases have been reported even when patients'
mood state has been controlled for (Edwards, Pearce, Collett and Pugh, 1992).
Researchers have suggested that these memory biases are theoretically important in
understanding chronicity as they may lower mood (Pincus, Pearce, and McClelland,
1995), heighten pain intensity (Pincus, Griffith, Pearce Isenberg, 1996) and increase
an individual's sense of vulnerability. An interesting recent paper (Pincus and
Newman, 2001) demonstrated the potential role of this memory bias in determining
health care utilisation. This study found an association between the degree of an
individual's pain-related recall bias and the number of referrals to external specialists
that had been made by their general practitioner.
This section has made it clear that patients who have chronic pain differ from others
in terms of their beliefs and in how they process pain-related information. The
theoretical rationale behind these studies suggests that certain patterns of thinking
may help to maintain the chronic pain state. Interventions developed from these types
of studies attempt to alter these patterns of thinking, with the aim of reducing pain or
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bolstering the coping resources of chronic pain patients. These interventions will be
reviewed later (see section 1.3).
1.2.4 Characterological models
There is a longstanding tradition of employing personality concepts in the
understanding of chronic pain. The history of this line of research can be traced to
early psychodynamic formulations that viewed pain as arising out of early
developmental experiences. Indeed, four of Freud's female patients had pain as a
prominent symptom. Breuer and Freud (1893/1974) proposed that unexplained pains
could be understood as a hysterical reaction on the part of the patient. Such reactions,
they claimed, were best understood as the conversion of unpleasant affect into bodily
pain, with the exact choice of symptom (or site of pain) being determined by
precipitating psychological events that have a symbolic meaning for the patient.
Since Freud's writings, many other psychoanalytically oriented theorists have
proposed dynamic explanations for such phenomena as sympathetic labour pains to
phantom limb pains (see Merskey, 2000, for a review).
Since that time there have been repeated attempts to define a 'pain-prone', or
'migraine-prone' personality. Overall, however, these attempts have met with little
success (Gatchel and Weisenberg, 2000) and have been extensively criticised by
some authors who complain that viewing pain patients (or groups of pain patients) as
broadly homogeneous is an approach that is doomed to failure (Gatchel, 1991).
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The majority of the subsequent work on the role of personality in chronic pain has
been conducted by investigators based in the United States and has used the
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI: McKinley and Hathaway,
1940). The MMPI is a 566-item self-report test that was developed as an aid to help
in the diagnosis of psychiatric disorder. The test is an interesting one in that the items
were chosen from a larger pool of items, solely on the empirical basis ofwhether or
not they distinguished groups of individuals with different psychiatric disorders. It
consists of 10 clinical scales alongside 4 validity scales (these latter scales, for
example, assess the extent to which an individual tries to present an overly positive
image or tries to 'fake' their answers). The clinical scales are thought to represent a
mixture of states (or symptoms) and traits (Trimboli and Kilgore, 1983) and the
original authors recommended interpreting the profile of scores across the scales,
rather than single scale scores. The two commonest patterns of scores that
researchers have reported finding in patients with chronic pain are 'the neurotic triad'
and the 'conversion valley' (see Robinson, 2000, for a review ofMMPI findings in
chronic pain). The 'neurotic triad' consists of elevated scores on the following scales;
'Hypochondriasis', 'Depression', and 'Hysteria'. Individuals who show this pattern
have high levels of somatic complaints and depressive feelings, and are hypothesised
to have conflicted feelings about dependency. The 'conversion valley' profile
(Graham, 1993), which has perhaps been found more consistently among chronic
pain patients than any other profile, consists of elevated scores on 'Hypochondriasis'
and 'Hysteria', with comparatively low scores for 'Depression'. Hanvik (1951)
summarised the prevailing opinion about the role that the 'conversion valley' profile
played in pain patient's self-concept, suggesting that they would profile describe
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themselves thus: "I have numerous bodily complaints, but I am relatively unworried,
not depressed" (p. 351). Essentially, this approach emphasises somatic preoccupation
as the major factor in chronic pain.
There has been a vast body of work over the years that has attempted to use these
profiles to distinguish between 'organic' and 'functional' pain patients. However, the
results of these studies can best be described as mixed. Furthermore, in the light of
the gate-control theory of pain and more recent biopsychosocial models, the
attempted distinction has been seen as not very meaningful (Keller and Butcher,
1991). This type of work has also often been criticised for positing a causal role for
these profiles, when these observed patterns could simply be one outcome following
years of living with a painful condition (Robinson, 2000).
Several, more useful, studies have given the MMPI a wider role. One such study
examined whether certain profiles predicted variations in treatment outcomes (this
will be examined later, see section 1.4). Another type of study has specifically
addressed the criticism that differences in MMPI profiles may simply be the result of
living for years with a painful condition and have employed the MMPI in
longitudinal research that has charted the development of chronic pain. One study
followed 3020 aerospace company employees for a period of 4 years (Bigos, Battie,
Spengler, Fischer, Fordyce, Hanson, Nachemson and Wortley, 1991) and found that
the 'Hysteria' sub-scale was one of the prime variables that predicted the 279
employees who reported back problems. Studies such as this reflect the usefulness of
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personality concepts in understanding chronic pain. However, the MMPI is not the
only personality measure to have been employed with chronic pain patients.
Whilst the MMPI focuses on personality structures that can be viewed as
pathological, other instruments, that measure what may be termed 'normal'
personality structures, have also been used in the study of chronic pain. A number of
studies, for example, have made use of the personality concept ofNeuroticism
(usually using the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire, EPQ: Eysenck and Eysenck,
1975). Some longitudinal studies using the EPQ have found that Neuroticism
predicts the development of severe neck pain (Pietri-Taleb, Riihimaki, Viikari-
Juntura and Lindstrom, 1994) and new onset ofmigraine headache (Breslau, Chilcoat
and Andreski, 1996). Studies such as these suggest that the proneness to distress that
neuroticism represents can contribute to physiological changes or lifestyle habits that
are linked with disease progression.
Current consensus in personality theory has suggested that there are five major
personality traits (known as the Big-Five personality theory, McCrae and Costa,
1987), consisting of Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism
and Openness to Experience. Wade and Price (2000) have postulated roles for all
five of the Big-Five personality factors in the treatment of chronic pain. They
suggest, for example, that Openness to Experience may be relevant, in that patients
who score highly on this trait may be more willing to try different approaches to their
chronic pain than those whose Openness score is low. Similarly, they suggest that
high scores on the Agreeableness trait may make the formation of therapeutic
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alliance easier and that those who score highly on Conscientiousness are more likely
than those with low scores to complete their therapeutic homework assignments.
These are interesting speculations as they posit roles for personality theory in chronic
pain rehabilitation and, as such, show a departure from existing research that has
tended to focus on personality having a role in the psychogenesis and maintenance of
chronic pain. Unfortunately, no empirical work has been completed using this
theoretical orientation.
Apart from the work on how personality may affect treatment outcome, the
remaining research thread in the personality and chronic pain field involves the
impact of personality disorder. Personality disorder suggests that" personality traits
are inflexible and maladaptive and cause significant functional impairment or
subjective distress" (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). They are defined as
"an enduring pattern of inner experiences and behaviour that deviates markedly from
the individual's culture, is pervasive and inflexible, has an onset in adolescence or
early adulthood, is stable over time and leads to distress or impairment" (American
Psychiatric Association, 1994). The different types of personality disorder are laid
out in Axis II of the DSM IV and fall within three clusters. 'Cluster A' comprises of
paranoid personality disorder, schizoid personality disorder, and schizotypal
personality disorder. 'Cluster B' contains antisocial personality disorder, borderline
personality disorder, histrionic personality disorder, and narcissistic personality
disorder. Whilst, 'Cluster C' consists of avoidant personality disorder, dependent
personality disorder, and obsessive-compulsive personality disorder. There also
exists a final type, known as personality disorder not otherwise specified. Although
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numerous researchers and clinicians have investigated the personality characteristics
of chronic pain patients, few have examined the prevalence of personality disorders
among such patients.
Personality disorders are notoriously difficult to diagnose. These difficulties arise
from the frequently found comorbidity (Links, Heslegrave, & Villella, 1998)
between the disorders found in Axis I (the clinical disorders of anxiety, depression
and schizophrenia) and Axis II (personality disorders) of the DSM IV (American
Psychiatric Association, 1994). The picture is further complicated by poor inter-
diagnostic reliability between clinicians (Holdwick, Hilsenroth, Castlebury, & Blais,
1998). However, even with these diagnostic problems, the evidence is fairly clear
that personality disorder is fairly prevalent among chronic pain patients.
Weisberg (2000) reviewed the results of seven studies that had used a variety of
diagnostic methodologies to examine the prevalence of personality disorders among
chronic pain patients. This review found high rates, varying between 31 and 64 per
cent, and much higher than that found in the general population. Prevalence rates of
the personality disorders from Cluster A were generally low, although one study did
report that 33 per cent of patients met the criteria for diagnosis of paranoid
personality disorder (Polatin, Kinney, Gatchel, Lillo and Mayer, 1993). The
personality disorders from Cluster B were more prevalent, with prevalence rates for
the diagnosis of'histrionic' and 'narcissistic' personality disorder often being over 10
per cent. Finally, four out of the five studies that had examined 'dependent'
personality disorder found prevalence rates greater than 10 per cent.
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This kind of information is useful, not only in identifying psychological need in pain
patients, but because some authors have suggested that these kinds of personality
factors are "one of the most challenging tasks for pain clinicians" (Weisberg and
Keefe, 1999, p.56). For example, it has been suggested that patients with borderline
personality disorders make more demands on clinical staff and demand immediate
and specialised attention (Gatchel, 2000). As the review by Weisberg (2000)
suggested that personality disorders are very prevalent among pain patients (in the
United States, at least), this then raises the question about the extent to which these
problems influence these patients' treatment.
1.3 Treatment of Chronic Pain
Aside from anaesthesiology led pain clinics and orthopaedic surgery, most of the
current treatments offered to chronic pain patients involve applying cognitive-
behavioural methods to address those factors (described above) that are thought to
contribute to the maintenance of the pain state and accompanying illness behaviours.
These treatment packages are often multi-disciplinary (usually involving, various
combinations of psychologists, physiotherapists, nursing staff, occupational
therapists and anaesthetists), usually conducted (in Britain, at least) on an out-patient
basis, and can be presented either to patients individually or in groups (see Pearce
and Erskine, 1993, for a comprehensive description). Such treatments employ both
operant and cognitive methods. The group programme is thought by many to have
advantages, due to the special therapeutic factors that groups generate (see Yalom,
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1986), over individual treatment. The content of a typical group programme is
described in Williams and Erskine (1995) and the major features are given below.
Education
Patients are taught about the complexities of the pain experience with a major focus
on challenging beliefs that pain is always a sign of injury. Such an understanding is
necessary for patients to be able to engage fully with the physical therapy aspects of
the programme. Patients will also be taught about the beneficial effects of exercise
on their joints (through improving the flow of synovial fluid) and how exercise will
also help to improve the condition of their muscles. Some time will also be spent on
raising awareness of the effects of chronic pain on the patients' lives. Such an
approach helps to broaden the focus of treatment away from a narrow concern with
pain intensity and suffering and on to wider aspects of the patients' problems.
Improving physical condition
Multi-disciplinary pain-management programmes almost always contain a physical
therapy regime that is comprised of a graded series of simple exercises. These
exercises will be started from an easily achievable baseline that the patient can
manage without an accompanying increase in the intensity if their pain. Patients will
be encouraged to practice these exercises regularly and to gradually increase the
number of repetitions, or the range ofmovement involved (a process known as
pacing). Regaining fitness is believed to improve confidence and self-efficacy
beliefs, alongside the intrinsic benefits of muscle strength and joint mobility.
Importantly, the patient is encouraged to perform these exercises and activities at the
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planned level, regardless of how well, or unwell, they are feeling (exceptions are
made for serious pain flare-ups).
Recovery of activities
This same 'pacing' approach will be taken with the physical aspects of activities
involved in daily living (for example, sitting, standing, using a keyboard, and so on).
The particular activities will usually be guided by short and long-term goals set
within the areas ofwork, leisure, domestic activity and relationships. Patients will set
homework tasks that are negotiated with staff, who will (often with the help of other
patients) also help the patient to recognise obstacles that may get in the way of
attaining these goals. Problems with these tasks will often produce material for the
cognitive work (see below). There is clearly the potential for these goals to be
undermined by over-solicitous family members or friends, who may be often used to
doing many of these activities for the patient. Therefore, it is widely regarded as
important to involve these family or friends, who may have difficulty in
understanding the programmes aims and methods. It is also recognised that asking
family and friends to reduce the help that they give may result in them losing a
valued role in the patient's life.
Relaxation and sleep management
Relaxation skills are taught widely in these programmes. This is for two important
reasons. Firstly, it is recognised that muscular tension is prevalent among chronic
pain patients and that relaxation is useful to tackle general psychophysiological
arousal. Secondly, among some groups of patients, muscular tension is thought to
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contribute to pain intensity and that relaxation that lowers this tension may have
analgesic properties. However, it is important to emphasise that relaxation is not a
powerful analgesic, in case a feeling of failure results when patients' high
expectations are not met. Pain patients often have difficulty sleeping, therefore,
teaching sleep hygiene practices (such as relaxing before bed-time, not napping in
the daytime, having an established night-time routine, and so on) can be helpful to
patients (Morin, Kowatch and Wade, 1989).
Medication reduction
Many chronic pain sufferers are prescribed opiates by their physician in an attempt to
offer some form of help to patients who are often very demanding. However, these
drugs rarely help (Brena and Sanders, 1991), and often have many side effects that,
in turn, contribute to patient's feelings of being unwell. A further problem is that
opiate overuse may be maintained by the operant processes that were described
above. Therefore, many pain-management programmes give information on the
effects and side effects and also offer advice on medication reduction. A major part
of this advice is to change patterns of medication usage so that it is time rather than
pain-contingent.
Improving mood and confidence
This usually involves cognitive techniques to tackle patients' misconceptions
regarding pain and the types of'thinking errors' that were described earlier. Thought
diaries and other standard forms of eliciting, elaborating and challenging negative
cognitions are employed. Catastrophising is a common thinking error that is tackled
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in such programmes. For example, patients will often report experiencing a pain in a
new site, or an increase in pain intensity, and imagine that this signals further decline
or a worsening of an underlying pathology. A great deal of anxiety and a sense of
hopelessness about the future will often accompany such catastrophic thoughts. In
such a case, patients will usually be encouraged to examine their previous
experiences of variations in their pain and asked to reflect on what the usual outcome
was. Often this process will reveal that such changes in pain are common and often
resolve themselves in a matter of days. Patients are then encouraged to generate a
thought that contains a more realistic view, to note this down, and then to substitute
this thought for the catastrophic one that they generally employed in the past.
Any successes from the rest of the programme (improving fitness, increases in
activity, a greater control over medication, and so on) are praised. This helps to
highlight success, challenge feelings of helplessness, improve self-efficacy beliefs
and ultimately maintain the patient's motivation to continue with the programme.
Generalisation and skill maintenance
Pain management programmes usually encourage patients to consider any long-term
goals that they might have and the steps that will be required to achieve them.
Patients are encouraged to consider the possible obstacles in the way of achieving
their goals and to detail the steps that need to be taken, bearing in mind the pacing
principles that they have been taught in other parts of the programme. This process
helps the patient to generalise the lessons learned to wider aspects of their lives and
provides a detailed plan for continuing to practice the skills that they have learned.
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Relapses and pain flare-ups are discussed and patients are encouraged to develop a
written plan detailing how they would respond to these eventualities.
1.4 Outcome studies of pain management programmes
Rather than review a series of studies of varying methodological quality, this review
will focus on the analysis and results of a recent meta-analysis that examined
randomised controlled trials (RCT's) of cognitive behaviour therapy (CBT) and
behavioural treatments for chronic pain. Morley, Eccleston and Williams (2000)
found 25 RCT's that had compared CBT or behavioural therapy (without the
cognitive component) to control groups of patients receiving either no treatment or
an active (non CBT) treatment. Outcomes from these RCT's were measured in a
variety of ways, reflecting the multiple dimensions of chronic pain. These outcomes
included pain experience, mood/affect, cognitive coping and appraisal, pain
behaviour, biology/physical fitness, social role functioning, and use of health care
systems. Compared with no treatment controls, CBT and behavioural treatments
produced significant gains across all measurement categories, with an average effect
size (as measured by Cohen's g) of 0.5. Compared to active treatment controls, CBT
was more effective in the domains of pain experience, cognitive coping and
appraisal, and behavioural expressions of pain. Interestingly, particularly as CBT was
developed as a treatment for mood disorders, CBT treatments were no more effective
than other active controls in terms of its effects on mood/affect and social
functioning. When behavioural treatments (without the cognitive elements) were
compared against active controls, they only showed reliable benefits for expressions
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of pain behaviour and social role functioning. Unfortunately, the meta-analysis did
not make direct comparisons of CBT and behavioural treatments of chronic pain, and
the relatively poor performance of the latter may be attributable to the fact that there
were fewer studies on which these estimates were based.
1.4.1 Variations in outcome from pain management
Morley and his colleagues reported an average moderate effect of pain management.
There was considerable variability around this average effect (the distribution was
described as heterogeneous) which was not explained well by study characteristics.
The variability in effectiveness of cognitive-behavioural programmes for treating
chronic pain raises the question of whether there are some groups of patients that do
well and others who do poorly. Morley and his colleagues (2000), in their meta¬
analysis, excluded headache patients on the grounds that, for pain reduction at least,
they might be expected to show greater benefits from treatment than other patients.
They go further in claiming that for the rest of the heterogeneous chronic pain
patients "neither diagnosis, nor site of pain, nor medical findings are an apparent
major source of variance in any of the targets for treatment" (p. 2). Although these
medico-physical factors appear to be unrelated to outcome, there have been some
findings suggesting that psychosocial variables may predict who does better or worse
from pain management.
Kems and his colleagues (2000), using the pain stages of change model, reported
variations in outcome, in so much as patients with certain profiles (high pre-
contenrplation and low contemplation scores) were more likely to drop out of
35
treatment. Another study, employing models from the psychotherapy literature,
suggested that repression of emotional experience could interfere with outcomes
from pain-management (Bums, 2000). The author created four groups by splitting
patients around the median on a measure of anxiety (the Anxiety Content Scale from
the MMPI-2), and a lie scale (again from the MMPI-2). 'Repressors', who were one
of the groups, were distinguished by a low anxiety score and high lie scale score. The
analysis of outcome from treatment revealed that the group of'repressors' showed the
least improvement out of the four groups on measures of depression (the Beck
Depression Inventory: BDI, Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock and Erbaugh, 1961) and
pain severity (the Pain Severity Scale of the Multidimensional Pain Inventory; Kerns,
Turk and Rudy, 1985). It should also be noted that there was no main effect of
anxiety on outcome. Bums (2000) claims that 'repressors' fare poorly because they
struggle to acknowledge their problematic thoughts and behaviours, and
consequently do not engage in treatment that aims to change these.
Another study offered a more simplistic explanation for variation in outcome. Risk,
Turvey, Morgan and Humphreys (1997) analysed the outcome from a Fife based
health management programme that was delivered to some patients in a group format
and to others on an individual basis. They split their sample into two groups; patients
who were assessed as having pain as their only problem and patients who also had a
co-morbid psychological problem (including anxiety, depression, grief, marital
problems, post traumatic stress disorder, panic, phobia and sexual problems).
Interestingly, they reported that patients who only had pain as a problem (that is, no
psychological co-morbidity) had higher 'did not attend' rates than did patients with
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multiple problems. This difference was also reflected in psychologist ratings of
treatment outcome (a six point scale with poles labelled 'complete improvement' and
'worse') which showed that patients with both pain and psychological problems had a
significantly better outcome (22 per cent showing complete or marked improvement
compared to 15 per cent of'pain only' patients). There are a variety of possible
explanations for this finding. The first is that patients with multiple problems
recognise their need for help, are more motivated to attend reliably, and therefore
have a better outcome. Secondly, CBT is only appropriate for patients who have
additional problems and may even be off-putting (or not seen as having any value) to
patients whose only problem is chronic pain.
Interestingly, a study of outcomes from a physical therapy programme for chronic
pain patients (Williams, Grant and Main, 1995, cited in Watson, 2000) suggests that
those with psychological problems (including depression and somatic anxiety) have a
much poorer outcome from treatment as measured by pain intensity and disability
ratings. These findings do not necessarily contradict those ofRisk and her colleagues
(1997), rather, it may suggest that psychologically based treatments are particularly
successful for those who have psychological needs. Clearly, psychological problems
will be addressed more capably by a clinical psychology led pain service, whilst they
may interfere in treatment in a service where these needs are not as comprehensively
addressed.
Another unpublished study of the effects of physical therapy (Muncey and Watson,
1999) reported that fear-avoidance beliefs might also play a role in determining
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outcome. Using the TSK they found that the degree of shift in these beliefs across
physiotherapy treatment was the single biggest predictor of residual disability at the
end of treatment.
Finally, one study examined a host of factors that were potentially associated with
attrition from a multidisciplinary pain management programme (Coughlan, Ridout,
Williams and Richardson, 1995). This study had two stages: the first stage involved
examining the physical and psychological profiles of those who dropped out during
the 4-week inpatient treatment phase, the second stage examined those who failed to
attend for their six month follow-up appointment. In a series of logistic regression
analyses, just two variables, self-efficacy and the distance walked in ten minutes,
predicted dropout from treatment, whilst only 'catastrophising' cognitions predicted
failure to attend for follow-up.
It is evident that there has not been a great deal of research examining variations in
outcome from pain management. The next session examines the broader
psychological literature with the aim of identifying other variables that might have
the potential to affect treatment outcome.
1.5 Outcome from CBT for depression
Most of the research that has examined outcomes from pain management
programmes has focused on demonstrating which treatments are most effective. As
the above discussion illustrates, there has been comparatively little research
examining what causes variation in outcome from treatment. This primary focus on
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demonstrating treatment effectiveness parallels the history of outcome research in
psychotherapy for depression (Jarrett, Eaves, Granneman and Rush, 1991). Hollon
and Najavits (1988) distinguished between 'predictive' and 'prognostic' indicators of
treatment outcome. 'Predictive' indicators show which treatments are best for which
groups of patients. 'Prognostic' indicators are those that predict which patients
respond to an individual treatment type. Among the latter type of research, there
exists a small body of research that has investigated whether certain types of
dysfunctional assumptions, theorised to be prevalent among depressed individuals,
are predictive of patients' responses to CBT for depression.
The Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale (DAS: Weissman, 1979) is a measure of
assumptions (or schema) that are theorised to underlie the development and
maintenance of depression. It has been examined by some studies as a variable that
may potentially moderate responsiveness to CBT for depression. Keller (1983), Shea
(1987) and Jarrett and his colleagues (1991) examined the efficacy of cognitive
therapy given to outpatients suffering from depression. All three of these studies
found that patients who entered therapy with high DAS scores had poorer outcomes
than did patients with lower DAS scores at entry. Clearly, such a difference may
simply be a reflection of pre-treatment differences in depression severity. Jarrett and
his colleagues (1991) examined this possibility by conducting a series of regression
analyses where these pre-treatment differences were held constant. In their analyses
of outcome from cognitive therapy, where outcomes were represented as changes in
the Beck Depression Inventory and the Hamilton Depression Rating Scale, the DAS
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was a significant predictor of treatment success, even when pre-treatment differences
on these two scales were controlled for.
What is the relevance of this for outcome from pain management treatment? Beck
(1996) and Young (1990) have both proposed that personality disorders can be
characterised by inflexible core beliefs (similar to those that are measured by the
DAS). Furthermore, a number of authors (for example, Beck, Freeman and
associates, 1990) have noted that CBT, which was originally designed as a short-
term, problem-focused form of psychotherapy, may, if it is not modified, be a
relatively ineffective type of treatment for patients with a personality disorder.
Young (1994) has argued that this failure is due to four aspects of personality
disorder that make it difficult for cognitive therapy to be successful. He suggests that
patients with a personality disorder often do not have readily identifiable problems
that traditional CBT would make the focus of treatment. He also suggests that
patients with personality disorder have interpersonal difficulties that threaten to
undermine the collaborative therapeutic relationship that is required in CBT.
Traditional cognitive therapy also emphasises the recognition and modification of
distortions in thinking. Young (1994) argues that this may be difficult for patients
who have a personality disorder, as the hallmark of their condition is the degree of
rigidity and inflexibility in personality traits and entrenched patterns of thinking.
Finally, Young (1994) argues that patients with a personality disorder chronically
block or avoid painful feelings and disturbing thoughts. As cognitive therapy asks
patients to identify, challenge and modify their thoughts, Young (1994) argues that
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this creates difficulties for patients with a personality disorder as, inevitably, this
involves confronting that which they fear most.
Given that there is a high prevalence rate of personality disorder among patients with
chronic pain (see above) the above analysis suggests that pain management
programmes, that employ an unmodified CBT approach, will find it difficult to
reliably produce a successful outcome for many patients.
1.6 Personality disorder, dysfunctional schemata, and outcome from pain
management
Beck and his colleagues (1990) have suggested that underlying each personality
disorder there is a specific set of beliefs and accompanying behavioural patterns. For
example, they suggest that patients with a dependent personality disorder have a
strongly held belief that they are incompetent and unable to cope on their own.
Whilst one study has demonstrated that the dysfunctional beliefs that are measured
by the DAS are related to broad measures of Axis II personality pathology (Ilardi and
Craighead, 1999), it has yet to be demonstrated that specific beliefs underlie
particular types of personality disorder.
Some authors have found that the DAS measures beliefs concerned with
achievement, dependency, and self-control (Power, Katz, McGuffin, Duggan, Lam
and Beck, 1994). If, as suggested by Ilardi and Craighead (1999) these beliefs are
generally more prominent among patients with a personality disorder, then it is
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possible that this may lead them to employ behavioural strategies that include relying
heavily on others, avoiding making important decisions and challenges, and
avoidance of emotionally charged situations. It is not difficult to imagine how these
kinds of core beliefs can interfere with the rehabilitative treatments that are offered
by pain management programmes. A patient who, for example, believes very
strongly that they are incompetent and who feels very fearful of new challenges and
consequently strives to avoid them, is not going to find it an easy task to engage with
the changes in thinking and behaviour that pain management programmes encourage.
Other examples cited by Beck (Beck, J.S. 1996) are patients with an avoidant
personality disorder who believe, according to schema theories of personality
disorder, that they are unlovable and vulnerable. Accordingly, these patients are
thought to avoid intimacy, criticism and often feel uncomfortable about being open
with others. Again, these kinds of difficulties have the potential to interfere with
treatment progress as this often relies on honest feedback from patients about such
things as the problems they had encountered with homework assignments. In a
similar vein, patients with obsessive-compulsive personality disorders are thought to
overvalue rules, responsibility and control which once more has the potential to
interfere with treatment.
These schema based theories imply that treatment is likely to be most successful if
patients who have a personality disorder are identified and offered a separate, longer
term and more intensive treatment that focuses more on the therapeutic relationship
(Beck, J. S., 1996). However, there are problems with this approach. The first of
these are problems with the reliability of diagnostic classification systems that seek
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to identify patients with personality disorders is poor (Weisberg, 2000). Therefore,
separating patients by personality disorder diagnosis is likely to be fraught with error
and there is the potential that such misclassification would be wasteful of resources
(as individual, rather than group, treatment may be judged to be necessary) and may
even do harm (through the process of'labelling' individuals). Secondly, the idea of
identifying patients with a personality disorder assumes that the kinds of schema that
have been identified as potentially disrupting treatment are only present in these
individuals and are absent in the rest of the patient population. Some authors have
challenged this belief. Widiger and colleagues (Widiger, Trull, Hurt, Clarkin and
Frances, 1987) have suggested, based on a multidimensional scaling analysis of
personality traits, that personality disorders should be thought of as dimensions,
rather than discrete entities. Such an approach would suggest that these dysfunctional
schemata may not be distributed in a multi-modal fashion, but rather, spread more
widely across the whole patient population.
There are currently two major measures of these dysfunctional schemata available to
researchers. The next section describes how the specific schemata that are measured
by these two scales might be related to outcome from pain management. This
discussion consists of describing a series of hypothesised mechanisms, related to
different schemata, by which these beliefs could result in poor outcome from
treatment.
The DAS was mentioned briefly above. There are a number of versions of this
measure. The 24 item version (the DAS-24; Power, Katz, McGuffin, Duggan, Lam
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and Beck, 1994) has a factor structure that has been carefully tested. This produces
three sub-scales, measuring beliefs related to 'Achievement' (e.g. 'My life is wasted
unless I am a complete success'), 'Dependency' (e.g. 'My happiness depends more on
other people than it does on me') and 'Self-control' (e.g. 'I should always have
complete control over my feelings').
Individuals who hold strong 'Achievement' beliefs may struggle with the pacing
approach that pain management advocates as they may interpret partial success as
indicative of failure. It is reasonable to speculate that they may also find it hard to
admit that they have made mistakes in the homework tasks that they were assigned
and therefore would not benefit from the corrective advice given by the group's
facilitators. Holding strong belief that others' happiness is more important than one's
own and that it is crucial to be supported by these others (as measured by the
'Dependency' sub-scale of the DAS-24) could interfere with a person's outcome from
pain management in a number ofways. Being overly concerned with others reactions
could make pacing difficult in that it requires patients to indicate to others that they
are unable to engage in certain activities because doing so would exceed the limits
that they had set themselves. Indeed, in recognition of this potential difficulty, the
pain management programme where the research described in this report was
conducted includes a session in its programme on assertiveness and dealing with the
demands of others. It is also possible to speculate that those who have strong
'Dependency beliefs may find assertiveness difficult, as they may fear that this could
lead to supportive others being driven away. Most pain management programmes are
provided as a group treatment. The discussions within these groups are often highly
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emotional. Individuals who have strong 'Self-control' beliefs may find the emotional
tone of these groups uncomfortable, which may lead them to drop out or to not attend
to these discussions. They may also be unwilling to acknowledge how their own
emotional states influence their behaviour and because of this, be unable to identify
and to change aspects of their behaviour that may be affecting their pain and level of
functioning.
The other popular measure of dysfunctional schemata is the Young Schema
Questionnaire. There are two versions of this questionnaire, the long form (Young
and Brown, 1999a) which measures sixteen schemata and the short form (Young and
Brown, 1999b), which measures one less. The confirmatory factor analyses of the
Long Form of the questionnaire also conducted a higher order factor analysis and
found that the fifteen schemata are reducible to five 'meta-schema' (or 'schema
domains', as Young, 1990, calls them). The short form is thought to have the same
factor structure. The five schema domains are described below and each is followed
by a discussion of how they might be related to outcomes from pain management.
Disconnection and Rejection
This comprises of the first five of the 'lower order' schema (that is, Emotional
Deprivation, Abandonment, Mistrust/Abuse, Social Isolation and Defectiveness/
Shame). Young and Behary (1998) describe it thus,
"This domain is characterised by the expectation that one's needs for security, safety,
stability, acceptance, nurturance, stability, protection, empathy, and guidance will not
be met in a predictable manner. They arise from explosive, critical, rejecting,
detached, withholding, unpredictable and abusive families of origin." (p. 347).
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As this schema domain is characterised by mistrust and a worry that others are
incapable of providing protection, it might be reasonable to assume that individuals
who have this schema domain will be wary of their therapists. As a consequence,
they may be less likely to follow their advice, fearing that to do so would put them at
risk. They may also not trust their fellow group members and find it difficult to learn
from their shared experiences.
Impaired Autonomy and Performance
This is comprised of the next four of the 'lower order' schema (that is, Failure,
Dependence/Incompetence, Vulnerability to Harm & Illness, and Enmeshment).
Individuals who have this schema domain are described by Young and Behary
(1998) as having,
"...expectations about themselves and their environment that interfere with their
perceived ability to separate, survive, function independently, or perform
successfully. This is typically the result of an enmeshed, overprotective, or
undermining family of origin that has failed to reinforce the child for performing
competently outside the family, or has neglected to foster skills for independent
functioning." (p. 347).
It is possible to view this schema domain as having a conceptual overlap with the
'Dependency' beliefs of the DAS. Therefore, patients with this set of schemata are
likely to have similar problems in pain management. This schema domain contains
additional beliefs about vulnerability that may be related to the fears of injury that
are measured by the TSK (Kori, et al., 1990) which has already been shown to be
related to outcome from pain management (Muncey and Watson, 1999)
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Other-directedness
This is comprised of the next two of the 'lower order' schema (that is, Subjugation,
and Self Sacrifice). It is described by Young and Behary (1998) as involving,
"... an excessive focus on the feelings, wishes, and desires of others, at the expense
of one's own needs — in order to gain approval, acceptance, love and connection, or
avoid retaliation, or to avoid retaliation, rejection, blame or loss. This usually
involves the suppression of one's natural inclinations and one's awareness of anger.
The child typically comes from an environment where acceptance was conditional:
the child learns to suppress normal needs and emotions in order to gain attention,
approval and love. In many cases, the parents' emotional needs and desires are
valued more than the unique needs and feelings of each child." (p. 348).
Possession of this schema domain may also undermine an individual's assertiveness
abilities and may affect the patient's ability to successfully pace their activities.
Overvigilance and Inhibition
This consists of the next two of the 'lower order' schema (that is, Emotional
Inhibition, and Unrelenting Standards). It is described by Young, and Behary (1998)
as consisting of,
"Within this domain, there is often an excessive emphasis on controlling one's
spontaneous feelings, impulses, and choices in order to avoid making mistakes.
Parents usually stress meeting rigid, internalised rules and expectations about
performance and ethical behaviour, often at the expense of happiness, self-
expression, relaxation, close relationships, or health. The typical family origin is
grim and sometimes punitive: performance, duty, perfectionism, following rules, and
avoiding mistakes predominate over pleasure, joy, and relaxation. There is usually an
undercurrent of pessimism and worry that things could fall apart if one fails to be
vigilant and careful at all times." (p. 348).
The unrelenting standards that are part of this schema domain appear to have a
conceptual relationship with the 'Achievement' beliefs of the DAS. Therefore,
individuals who score highly on this domain are unlikely to admit making mistakes.
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They may also be the kind of patient who would find it difficult to pace out their
activities (this is advised so that pain flare-ups are reduced) if they have rigid
expectations about the level of activity that they should be able to perform.
Impaired Limits
This is comprised of the last two of the 'lower order' schema (that is, Entitlement and
Insufficient Self-Control/Self-Discipline). Young and Behary (1998) describes it
thus,
"(A) deficiency in internal limits, responsibility to others, or long-term goal-
orientation. These schemata lead to difficulty in respecting the rights of others, co¬
operating with others, making commitments, or setting and meeting realistic personal
goals. Patients with these schemata typically have families characterised by
permissiveness, indulgence, or a sense of superiority, rather than appropriate
confrontation, discipline, and limits in relation to taking responsibility, co-operating
in a reciprocal manner, treating others as equals, and setting goals. In some cases, the
child may not have been pushed to tolerate normal levels of discomfort." (pp. 347-8)
As the above definition makes clear, individuals with beliefs from this schema
domain are not good at making commitments or setting goals. As pain management
invariably involves this kind of commitment and goal setting, then patients with
these schemata may find this a difficult approach to adopt. As their upbringing is
likely to have made them wary of activities that produce discomfort they may be
reluctant to engage in increased activity and the exercise programme that is usually a
major part of pain management.
Hopefully, the above discussion will have illustrated the ways in which these
schemata may effect patients' willingness to engage with their rehabilitation, and,
ultimately, their outcome from treatment. Unfortunately, these hypotheses are very
speculative. This level of speculation is unavoidable as there is an absence of
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empirical work that has examined the behaviours that are thought to follow from
these schemata.
Before leaving this discussion it is worth noting that these measures of schemata rely
on patients' self-reports. There has been some work suggesting that such self-reports
are open to particular biases. For example, it is well established that, on a range of
variables, individuals tend to give themselves themselves' more favourable and less
negative ratings than those that they give to (usually unspecified) others (see the
review by Taylor and Brown, 1988). When this work is combined with research
showing that depressed people show fewer of these positive biases, it has led some to
argue that it is 'mentally healthy' to enhance one's positive attributes in this way
(Taylor and Brown, 1988). However, more recent studies have questioned this
theory. Colvin, Block and Funder (1995) conducted a series of studies, using cross-
sectional and longitudinal data that examined the effects of these biases. First they
constructed an index that measured the discrepancy between their own and trained
raters descriptions of their personality that was weighted by how favourable the
personality traits were seen to be. Colvin and his colleagues (1995) found that those
participants whose evaluations were overly positive were described by others as
"concerned with their own adequacy, as self-pitying, self-defeating, as basically
anxious, and as lacking a sense of personal meaning in life" (p. 1156). This finding is
of relevance to this study as at least some of the schemata that are its focus are
associated with these 'pathological' personality attributes. One way around this
potential problem is to not rely exclusively on the self-reports of patients.
49
1.7 Conclusions and hypotheses
The above review suggests that outcome from CBT based pain management
programmes might be affected by the types of deep-rooted dysfunctional schemata
that are prevalent in those patients with a personality disorder. To date, there has not
been any research that has examined this suggestion (not even examining whether
personality disorder affects outcome). The aim of this research is to examine the
central hypothesis that dysfunctional schemata are associated with a poor outcome
from a multi-disciplinary pain management programme. As there have been doubts
about the validity of self-reports of personality characteristics (to which schemata are
related) this study will also examine whether the associations between schemata and
outcome vary according to whether these beliefs are derived from self versus
informant reports. The study hypotheses are described, in formal terms, below.
Hypothesis 1. Following treatment in the pain management programme, participants'
scores on the outcomes measures of pain, self-efficacy, mood, Pain Stages of
Change, physical functioning, disability, and fear of (re-)injury, will have improved.
Hypothesis 2. Patients who report high levels of dysfunctional beliefs, as measured
by the YSQ-SF, will show less improvement on the outcomes measures, following
the pain management programme, compared to those who report lower levels of
dysfunctional beliefs.
Hypothesis 3. Patients whose family and friends report that the patient has high
levels of dysfunctional beliefs, as measured by the YSQ-SF, will show less
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improvement on the outcomes measures, following the pain management
programme, compared to those whose family and friends report lower levels of
dysfunctional beliefs.
Hypothesis 4. Patients whom the psychologists rate as having high levels of
dysfunctional beliefs will show less improvement on the outcomes measures,
following the pain management programme, compared to those who are rated as
having lower levels of dysfunctional beliefs.
Hypothesis 5. Patients who report high levels of dysfunctional beliefs, as measured
by the DAS, will show less improvement on the outcome measures, following the
pain management programme, compared to those who report lower levels.
Hypothesis 6. Those patients who complete the pain management programme, and
patients who completed the assessments required by the programme, will have lower
levels of dysfunctional beliefs, as measured by the YSQ-SF self- and informant-





This study employed a within-subjects, observational, design. Parts of the data were
collected using postal survey methods, and these were combined with longitudinal
(pre and post-intervention) clinical and questionnaire data. Ethical approval was
obtained from the Lothian Research Ethics Committee.
2.2 Participants
Participants consisted of 66 chronic pain patients who were part of six consecutive
multi-disciplinary pain management programmes. Participants were marked for
exclusion if they did not have a full understanding of English, including in its written
form, or if they exhibited evidence of cognitive impairment. The clinical
psychologist assessed these criteria informally at the initial interview. As both of
these were also criteria for entry into the pain management programme, it was
unsurprising that none of the potential study participants had to be excluded. The
numbers of participants in each group varied from 9 to 12 (mode =11). The groups,
which ran from 1 January 2001, to 30 June 2001, took place in a large rehabilitation
hospital in the East of Scotland. Patient demographic characteristics are given in
Table 2.1.
The group programmes ran for 12 sessions, spread over 10-12 week periods, with
each session lasting for 3 hours. The content of a typical session would normally
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involve a physiotherapist led exercise session, individual goal setting, group
feedback on pacing, relaxation and on the goal-directed homework that had been set
in previous sessions. Each session would also include a talk/demonstration. These
talks covered various aspects of pain management, from a cognitive-behavioural
perspective, and followed the format of a typical pain management programme (see
the introduction for a description of cognitive-behavioural pain management
programme).
Table 2.1. Demographic characteristics of the sample
Age at start of group (years) Mean Standard deviation
(3 cases with missing data) 44.4 9.7
Sex Males Females
26(39%) 40(61%)
Marital Status Married/Cohabiting Single/Divorced/ Widowed
(3 cases with missing data) 46(70%) 16(30%)
Occupational Status Working Not Working
(3 cases with missing data) 10 (17%) 50 (83%)
Patients recruited to this particular programme were unselected as regards the site of
their pain. The commonest site of pain among this sample was in the lower back (see
Table 2.2, for a description of the pain characteristics of this sample) which is typical
for pain management programmes.
2.3 Instruments.
2.3.1 Outcome variables
Outcome from the pain management programme is routinely assessed across a
number of domains. These domains consisted of pain intensity, mood, self-efficacy,
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stages in the acceptance of a self-management approach to pain, self-reported
disability, physical functioning, and fear of (re-)injury. The variables that were used
to measure these domains were not selected by the author. Rather, these variables are
those that the department in which the research was conducted use routinely to guide
assessment and treatment. The choice of the specific variables used in the department
was guided by the recommendations issued by a conference that was convened to
discuss outcome measurement from pain management programmes (Peat, Moores,
Goldingay and Hunter, 2000; Williams, 2000).
Table 2.2. Characteristics of the pain histories of the sample
Site of pain Number^ %
Lower back 45 68










Years of pain 7.7 5.5
Number of pain days in last week 5.3 1.7
Number of GP visits in last month 1.9 2.2
Number %
Current analgesic use (at start of 54 82
group)
^ Individuals can have pain in multiple sites. Therefore the numbers in these
categories exceed the total number in the sample
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The department recorded the total scale scores but not the individual item scores
(where a scale is constructed from multiple items). Consequently, the scores for the
individual items were not available to the author. Therefore, the internal consistency
of the scales could not be evaluated with this particular sample. However, these are
popular measures and their psychometric properties are generally well known.
With the exception of the measures of physical functioning, these measures consisted
of questionnaire data. The first set of questionnaires were posted out to patients
approximately one week prior to the commencement of the programme and were
collected from patients on the first day of treatment. At the end of the penultimate
group session the second set of questionnaires were distributed to the patients. These
were then collected during the last session. The first set of physical functioning
measures was carried out during the assessment interview (approximately four to
eight weeks prior to treatment). The second set was collected during the last
treatment session.
Pain
A ten-point, numerical rating scale (NRS) was employed to measure pain intensity
(see Appendix I, question 6). The department also employs a second NRS that
measures the degree of pain-related distress that is experienced. However, this was
not used in this study as this is a less popular measure and its properties are less well
known. The NRS pain intensity measure was chosen because of its simplicity and
ease of use (Holroyd, Talbot, Holm, Pingel, Lake and Saper, 1996). An NRS type of
measure was chosen over a visual analogue scale (VAS) type of measure, the other
55
obvious and simple choice, because the former type ofmeasure is regarded as easier
for patients to use. For example, it has been reported that some older patients have
had difficulties in understanding VAS type measures (Jensen, Karoly and Braver,
1986). Furthermore, NRS measures are also thought to be more sensitive to
variations between patients (Jensen et al., 1986). The respondent's score is the
number chosen (from 0-10), with higher scores indicating a higher degree of pain
intensity. No formal psychometric or normative data are available, but NRS
measures of pain intensity have been found to correlate highly with other such
measures (Jensen et al., 1986). Other measures of pain were considered, such as
ratings of pain behaviours (for example Keefe and Block, 1982) and the McGill Pain
Questionnaire (Melzack, 1975). Flowever, the demands of these measures, in terms
of patient or staff time, precluded their use. An NRS pain intensity rating was
completed by the study participant, both before and at the end of their pain
management programme. Both of these variables appeared to be normally distributed
(see the low skewness and kurtosis estimates in Table 3.2). The key pain intensity
variable employed in this study is the degree of change between the assessment taken
pre-group and the assessment taken post group. This variable was also normally
distributed.
Self-efficacy
The Pain Self-Efficacy Questionnaire (PSEQ: Nicholas, 1988, see Appendix II) is a
ten-item, self-report inventory that seeks to assess a chronic pain patient's beliefs that
he/she can perform various activities or functions despite their pain. Patients are
asked to rate, on a seven point scale (where 0 equals 'not at all confident' and 6
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equals 'completely confident') how confident they feel about performing each of the
ten activities The potential range of scores is from 0 to 60 with high scores indicating
greater self-efficacy. Evidence of the reliability and validity of the PSEQ were
reported in an unpublished Ph.D. thesis (unfortunately, not available to the author).
However, this measure has been employed in two studies, both of which were
published in peer reviewed journals (Coughlan, et al, 1995; Nicholas, Wilson and
Goyen, 1992). This variable was measured at the same two time points as the NRS
ratings and they also appeared to be normally distributed. However, the change score
showed some degree of skewness and therefore it was transformed, using a natural
log transformation, that resulted in a more normal distribution (see Table 3.3).
Mood
The pain management programme routinely employs two measures of patients'
mood. These are the Beck Depression Inventory-Second Edition (BDI-II: Beck, Steer
and Brown, 1996) and the Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI: Beck, Epstein, Brown and
Steer, 1988). The BDI-II is 21 item self-report instrument for measuring the severity
of depression (see Appendix III) and it replaces the original BDI (Beck, Ward,
Mendelson, Mock and Erbaugh, 1961). Its revision was carried out to ensure that the
instrument corresponds to the criteria for diagnosing depressive disorder, as listed in
the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual ofMental
Disorders-Fourth Edition (DSM-IV: 1994). The original BDI became the most
widely used and well-accepted measure for assessing the severity of depression
(Pitrowski, Shelley and Keller, 1995), and the same may very likely be said of the
revised version. The BDI-II is scored by summing the ratings for the 21 items. Each
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item is rated on a 4-point scale, ranging from 0-3. This gives a possible range of
scores from 0-63. In terms of its psychometric properties, the BDI-II has a high
degree of internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha = 0.92, among psychiatric
outpatients) and demonstrates excellent test-retest stability over a period of one week
(r=0.93, p<0.001; Beck et al., 1996). Beck and his colleagues (1996) also showed
that the BDI-II has convergent (it has a strong association with the Hamilton
Psychiatric Rating for Depression, r=0.71: Hamilton, 1960) and discriminant validity
(as evidenced by the weaker association with the Hamilton Rating Scale for Anxiety,
r=0.47: Hamilton, 1959).
The Beck Anxiety Inventory (Beck et al, 1988, see Appendix IV) is also a 21 item
self completion instrument. It is designed to assess the severity of self-reported
anxiety in adults and adolescents. The items were selected from a total of 86
symptoms of anxiety (these being drawn from other, pre-existing measures of
anxiety) with items being rejected because of conceptual redundancy or by item
analyses. The items are scored on a 4-point scale (ranging from 0-3) with total
possible scores falling in the range of 0-63. The internal consistency of the scale is
reported to be good (Cronbach's alpha = 0.92, Beck et al., 1988). Test-retest
reliability over one week is also good (r=0.75, Beck et al., 1988). Research using the
BAI shows evidence of convergent and discriminant validity when the instrument is
correlated with other scales that measure anxiety and with those measuring
depression (Beck and Steer, 1993).
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Both of these variables were measured at the same two points in time as were the
other outcome variables. Whilst the BDI-II appeared to be normally distributed the
BAI scores, at both time points, showed some degree of skewness and therefore they
were transformed, using a natural log transformation, that resulted in more normal
distributions. Both the BAI and the BDI-II change scores appeared to be normally
distributed (see Table 3.4).
Pain Stages of Change Questionnaire (PSCOO; Kerns et ah. 1997).
This was described in the introduction. It is a 30-item, self-report measure that seeks
to ascertain preparedness to take on a self-management approach to chronic pain (see
Appendix V). Each item offers participants the choice of 5 Likert type responses
(ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree). The scale produces four sub-
scale scores (this division being supported by a confirmatory factor analysis; Kems
et al., 1997), representing the four theorised stages of behavioural change. These
stages are labelled, 'pre-contemplation' (7 items), 'contemplation' (10 items), 'action'
(6 items) and 'maintenance' (7 items). Kems and his colleagues (1997) report
adequate internal consistency statistics (Cronbach's alpha's were 0.77, 0.82, 0.86, and
0.86 for the above four scales, respectively) and test-retest stability over a period of
one to two weeks (0.74, 0.82, 0.76, and 0.88, respectively). A comparison of scores
across the four sub-scales is hampered by the fact that the number of items
comprising each sub-scale varies. In order to make these comparisons more
meaningful, the sub-scale scores are represented as average item scores (that is, the
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sub-scale total divided by the number of items in the sub-scale). The potential range
of scores is therefore between 1 and 5.
Like the other outcome variables, the PSOCQ was measured both prior to and at the
end of the pain management programme. All four sub-scales appeared to be normally
distributed at both time points as were the four scores that represented pre to post-
group changes in these variables (see Table 3.5).
Measures of Physical Functioning
Approximately four weeks prior to the start of the group each patient was assessed
by a psychologist and a physiotherapist in order to determine whether or not they
were suitable for the programme. During the physiotherapy part of this assessment
the patient's current level of physical functioning was assessed (see Appendix VI).
Part of this assessment included a test of the patient's walking. This was comprised
of two components, which were the number ofmetres walked in 2 minutes and a
physiotherapist rating of walk quality. Another component of the test was a measure
of standing from a sitting position. This comprised two parts; the number of sit-to-
stand movements completed in 2 minutes and a physiotherapist rating of sit to stand
quality. Patients were also asked to get down, and back up from, a prone position on
the floor. Patients' difficulty with this manoeuvre was also rated by the
physiotherapist. Finally, the assessment consisted of a measure of patients' self-
reported difficulty in climbing stairs. Only the two timed components of this
assessment were included here (the walking and sit-to-stand tests). The reason for not
including the other components (which were all quality ratings) was that there is little
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information on the psychometric properties of these assessments when used with this
patient group. The other two tests, on the other hand, have been demonstrated to have
good test-retest and inter-rater reliability characteristics (Harding, Williams,
Richardson, Nicholas, Jackson, Richardson and Pither, 1994). Harding and
colleagues (1994) also produced results suggesting that these are valid measures of
physical functioning (this was demonstrated by a pattern of statistically significant
correlation coefficients of these measures with each other and with other measures of
physical functioning). These measures were also shown to be sensitive to changes
representing improvements following multi-disciplinary pain management treatment
(Harding et al., 1994).
Both of the walking assessments showed a significant degree of skew, which was
reduced using natural log transformations. The sit-to-stand assessments, on the other
hand, showed a more normal distribution. Both the walking and sit-to-stand change
scores were markedly skewed and kurtotic. Attempts were made to transform the
distribution of these variables, but with little effect. Plots of the distribution
suggested a few extreme values that were distorting the distribution of these
variables. After these values were removed (3 values were removed from the walking
change score and 2 from the sit-to-stand change score) the distributions of these
'trimmed' variables appeared to approximate a normal distribution (see Table 3.6).
Disability
This was measured, both pre and post-group, using the short form of the Sickness
Impact Profile (SIP-SF: Roland and Morris 1983, see Appendix VII). The SIP-SF is
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a self-report measure consisting of 23 items that ask about the presence or absence of
functional problems. Responses are dichotomous (yes/no, scored 1 or 0) and the
potential range of scores from this scale if from 0 to 23. The SIP-SF was developed
from the longer (136 item) Sickness Impact Profile (SIP-LF: Bergner, Bobbitt, Carter
and Gibson, 1981) and was chosen over the SIP-LF for a number of reasons. These
reasons included its brevity (particularly important as the study participants were
asked to fill in a number of questionnaires) and the fact it appears to be as
psychometrically sound as the long-form (Jensen, Strom, Turner and Romano, 1992).
The only disadvantage of the SIP-SF, as compared to the SIP-LF, is that its coverage
of psychosocial aspects of disability is relatively poor. However, as participants were
completing a number ofmore detailed measures of their psychological state (affect
and beliefs) this was not seen as a major disadvantage. The SIP-SF appears to be
reasonably stable over time. The test-retest coefficients ranged from 0.65 to 0.77
over a range of different time intervals, with the median interval being 39 days
(Jensen et al., 1992). The scores also appeared to be normally distributed at both time
points, as were the change scores (see Table 3.7).
Fear of (re-)iniury
The Tampa Scale for Kinesiophobia (TSK: Kori et ah, 1990, see Appendix VIII) was
described in the Introduction. It is a 17 item, self-report measure of the fear of
movement and activity, in case these were to cause (further) physical damage.
Patients are asked to indicate their level of agreement/ disagreement with each of the
17 statements using a 4-point Likert scale. Four of the items are reverse coded (they
indicate a lack of fear) and the items are totalled to produce a score in the range from
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0 to 51. Work examining the validity of the measure was described in the
introduction. Cronbach's alpha for the scale was reported by Vlaeyen and his
colleagues (1995) to equal 0.77, which they described as fair. The TSK was
measured at the same two time points as the other outcome variables and descriptive
statistics are given in Table 3.8. Both the pre and post-group TSK scores, and the
TSK change scores appeared to be reasonably normally distributed (see Table 3.8).
A final dependent variable was the number of sessions attended by participants. This
may be an index of commitment to the self-management approach, but it is also
recognised that it may be affected by other factors such as pain severity, and health
and social problems. This variable was highly skewed (the median number of groups
attended was 10) and it was felt that a transformation (to make the variable more
normally distributed) was unwarranted as it could not be assumed that the underlying
distribution was a normal one.
2.3.2 Predictor variables
The Young Schema Questionnaire-Short Form (YSQ-SF)
The YSQ-SF is a 75-item scale that measures 15 different dysfunctional schemas and
five schema domains (Young and Brown, 1999a, see Appendix IX). It is derived
from the Long Form of the questionnaire, which is comprised of 205 items (Young
and Brown, 1999b). There has been little work examining the psychometric
properties of either of these questionnaires, and that is particularly the case with the
Short Form of the questionnaire. However, a recent study has suggested that the two
questionnaires have similar levels of internal consistency, reliability and discriminant
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validity (Waller, Meyer and Ohanian, 2001). Both exploratory and confirmatory
factor analyses have generally supported the hypothesised factor structure of the
Long Form. Unfortunately, there have been no published factor analytic studies of
the YSQ-SF. Flowever, Young reports on his web-site
(http://www.schematherapv.com/id55.htm. date accessed, 10 July, 2001) that two
recent, and as yet unpublished, studies find the same factor structure for the Short
Form as has been found for the Long Form. This would be a reasonable finding as
the items from the YSQ-SF are drawn from the items in the long forma that had the
highest factor loadings. The fifteen schemata and five schema domains of the YSQ-
SF were described in the introduction.
The 75 items of the YSQ-SF are each accompanied by a 6-point Likert rating scale.
This asks respondents to indicate how well the item describes them (from
'completely untrue ofme' to 'describes me perfectly'). Each of the individual
schemata comprises five items. This means that the individual schema scores have
the potential range of 6 to 36. Generally, these schema scales had reasonably high
levels of internal consistency. With a single exception (the scale measuring
'Entitlement/Grandiosity, which produced an alpha equal to 0.56) Cronbach's alphas'
ranged from 0.78 to 0.92 (see Table 3.9). The schema domain sub-scales are
comprised of between two and five of the individual schemata scores. The estimates
of the internal consistency of the schema domain sub-scales were equally impressive,
with alphas ranging from 0.78 to 0.93. The descriptive statistics for the participants'
YSQ-SF scores are also given in Table 3.9. Because of the large numbers of sub-
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scales that can be derived from the YSQ-SF, only results obtained from employing
the schema domains are reported in detail.
Informant ratings
As there were doubts about the validity of self-completion questionnaires, informant
ratings of the YSQ-SF were also used. These were obtained by asking the patients to
pass on to a 'friend or relative who knows you well' an adapted copy of the YSQ-SF
(see Appendix X). This informant version was identical to the patients' self-
completion version, with the exception that the instructions asked the informant to
'complete the questionnaire as if you are [patient's name inserted]'. The estimates of
the internal consistencies of the five schema domain sub-scales were as equally
impressive as for the self-completion inventory (Cronbach's alpha's ranged from 0.78
to 0.93, see Table 3.10).
Psychologist ratings
As the participants friends and relatives may not necessarily be astute judges of
personality, a further set of ratings were taken from the clinical psychologists that
were running the pain management groups. Time pressures precluded the (75 item)
YSQ-SF being employed for these ratings. Therefore, a short (5 item) rating scale
was used (see Appendix XI). The clinical psychologists were asked to judge, on a
four point Likert scale, how well the five schema domains from the YSQ described
the patients from their group. These ratings were scored as their inverse, so that
higher ratings reflected higher levels of the schema domains.
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The descriptions of these schema domains were derived from those given by Young
and Behary (1998; and see the introduction). These ratings were made after the 4th
session of the pain management programme. This point was chosen because it was
felt that it gave the clinical psychologists an opportunity to become acquainted
sufficiently with the patients. It was also deemed to be early enough in the course of
the programme for these judgements not to be coloured by the psychologists
becoming aware of the patient's likely outcome from treatment (the raters were aware
of the aims of the study). Anticipating that an awareness of the patient's likely
outcome may affect these ratings, the psychologists were also asked to make this
awareness explicit by rating each patient's likely outcome, on a 6-point scale. This
made it possible to adjust statistically the psychologists' ratings of the schema
domains.
These ratings were designed for this study and therefore their psychometric
properties were unknown. In an attempt to establish whether or not these ratings
could be carried out in a reliable manner by different psychologists the author and his
supervisor independently carried out these ratings on the participants from one of the
groups that they were both working in. These ratings were then correlated, using
Spearman's rho. These results are given in Table 2.3.
These results suggest that the majority of the items can be rated reliably by separate
psychologists. However, two of the items show only moderate and non-significant
associations. As these ratings were made on only nine cases (and the tests were very
low in statistical power) it was decided to retain these items, rather than dispensing
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with them altogether. However, more caution was exercised in interpreting results
that employed these two items.
Table 2.3. Inter-rater reliability estimates of the psychologist ratings (n = 9).
Schema Domain ratings Correlation Probability
coefficient value
1. Disconnection/Rejection 0.67 p<0.05
2. Impaired Autonomy 0.44 ns
3. Impaired Limits 0.88 p<0.01
4. Other-Directedness 0.76 p<0.05
5. Over-vigilance/Inhibition 0.49 ns
6. Outcome rating 0.68 p<0.05
Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale
The Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale (DAS Weissman and Beck, 1978, see Appendix
XII) is a measure of the underlying assumptions in Beck's (Beck, 1967) cognitive
theory of depression. Although the original scale is a very lengthy one (and lengthy
questionnaires were avoided wherever possible as the study participants were asked
to fill in a great many) there is a briefer DAS scale. The DAS-24 is a 24-item version
of the scale, the factor structure of which has been carefully tested (Power, Katz,
McGuffin, Duggan, Lam and Beck, 1994). This measure produces three sub-scales,
labelled 'Achievement', 'Dependency' and 'Self-control'. Each of these sub-scales
contains 8 items (with 3 on one sub-scale being scored inversely) and high scores
reflect higher levels of the assumptions it is thought to measure. The estimates of the




Patients for the pain management programme are referred from a variety of sources
and from a number of areas in central Scotland. Once the referral has been received
the patients are placed on a waiting list. Once at the top of the waiting list, patients
are invited for an assessment interview. In this interview the patients are seen by a
psychologist, who records their pain histories and assesses their readiness to engage
in self-management. An assessment is also made of other factors (such as current
high levels of psychological disorder) that may interfere with outcome from the
group programme. The patients are also seen by a physiotherapist, who assesses their
physical condition in order to establish whether they have the physical capabilities to
engage in the exercise portion of the group programme. The outcome of the
assessment interview is determined by whether or not any factors that might cause
treatment problems are uncovered. Patients whose treatment appears likely to be
uncomplicated are invited to take part in the group programme, and usually
commence this in 4 to 8 weeks following the assessment interview. Patients who
have more severe psychological problems are usually offered an individual pain
management programme (usually involving both psychology and physiotherapy) or
are given a short number of individual sessions with a psychologist with the aim of
them moving on to the group programme if this treatment is successful. Marked
physical problems are given a similar set of treatment options, with the emphasis on
individual physiotherapeutic treatment. Occasionally, either with or without
individual treatment, patients are judged as unlikely to benefit from the group
programme or from further individual treatment. These patients are discharged back
to the care of the referring agency. All of the participants in this study either entered
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the group directly following the assessment interview or after they had successfully
completed a short period of individual treatment.
The pain management programme participants were sent a letter, inviting them to
take part in the study, between one and two weeks prior to the commencement of the
group (see Appendix XIII). Along with this letter was a consent form (see Appendix
XIV), copies of the YSQ-SF and the DAS questionnaires (along with a stamped,
addressed envelope in which to return it), and an envelope that they were asked to
pass onto 'a family member or friend who knows you well'. Inside this envelope was
an information sheet letter, explaining the study and inviting them to take part. The
envelope also contained a consent form (see Appendix XV) and a copy of the YSQ-
SF (along with a stamped, addressed envelope in which to return it). The informant
version of the YSQ-SF contained the instructions to 'complete the questionnaire as if
you are [patient's name inserted]'. Participants who had not returned the
questionnaires before the group treatment commenced were reminded to do so at the
first session of the programme. If the questionnaires were still not returned by the
following week, then a letter was sent reminding participants to return them (see
Appendix XVI). This letter was accompanied by further sets of the questionnaires, in
case the original copies had been mislaid.
All of the questionnaires had a detachable front sheet that contained the patient's
name. These front sheets were removed on receipt of the questionnaires so that the
responses could only be linked to the participant through a unique identification
number. The questionnaires and identifying front sheets were stored separately.
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2.5 Statistical analyses
The data were entered into an SPSS database (version 10, SPSS inc, 2001) and the
majority of the analyses were conducted using this programme. The analyses
consisted of computing correlation coefficients to represent various associations.
These coefficients were computed using the Pearson product moment test unless the
data were not distributed normally (and the distribution could not be transformed to
normality), or when the sample size was below 20 cases. In these cases the
correlation coefficients were computed using Spearman's rho. Tests of mean
differences were conducted using independent t-tests.
One unfortunate aspect of this study was that there were very many tests of the same
hypothesis and, therefore, the chances ofmaking a type I error with an alpha level of
0.05 was high. One possible solution would have been to adjust the alpha level for
the total number of tests. However, this was too conservative an option as the
analyses were of low power due to the small sample size. One alternative was to
adjust the alpha level across bands of tests. For example, the association between the
participant's self-reported schema domain of Disconnection/Rejection and their
outcome from the programme was tested across 12 different dependent variables.
This set of tests was regarded as a 'band' and the alpha level within this band was
adjusted using Bonferroni's correction. This suggested a corrected alpha level of
0.004 that was then used to assess the statistical significance of an association.
Similar corrections were made across other 'bands' of tests.
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As there were so many tests of the hypothesis, weighted average correlation
coefficients were also computed using DSTAT (Johnson, 1989, 1993). This is a
software programme that is used in meta-analysis and was used for two reasons.
Firstly, correlation coefficients are not on a linear metric (that is, the difference
between 0.1 and 0.2 is less than the difference between 0.2 and 0.3) and so simple
averaging procedures can produce distorted estimates. Secondly, there were
variations in the sample sizes that produced these coefficients, but DSTAT calculates
an average, weighted coefficient that takes account of these differences. Post-hoc
power analyses were also conducted and these were based on the average correlation




3.1 Descriptive statistics and outcome from pain management (hypothesis 1)
Participant numbers varied considerably in these analyses. This was due to a number
of reasons. Firstly, some participants did not complete the initial pre-group
assessment measures. Secondly, twelve patients attended very few of the first four
sessions (6 had dropped out of the programme by session four) and so the
psychologists found it impossible to make schema and outcome ratings on these
patients. Thirdly, less than half of the potential study participants agreed to complete
the YSQ-SF, DAS, and to pass on the informant YSQ-SF to a relative or friend.
Finally, approximately half of the patients did not complete all or some of the post-
group assessment measures. This pattern of non-responses to different aspects of the
study resulted in marked variations in sample size across the following analyses. A
summary of the numbers of patients completing various aspects of the study is given
in Table 3.1. (below).
Means and standard deviations for all of the dependent variables are given in Tables
3.2 to 3.8. The average pain intensity NRS score at the start of the group programme
was 7.47, which was reduced to 6.84 by the end of the programme (see Table 3.2).
This change was statistically significant (t = 2.12, df = 37, p<0.05, one tailed) and
supported hypothesis 1. The standardised mean difference, between these two scores
is equivalent to a Cohen's g of 0.38.
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Table 3.1 Numbers of participants providing data for various aspects of the
study.
Aspect of the study Numbers*
1. Started the PMP 66
2. Provided both pre and post-PMP outcome data 34-38
3. Provided self-completion YSQ-SF data 32
4. Provided informant-completion YSQ-SF data 25
5. With Psychologist schema ratings 54
6. Provided DAS data 31
7. Provided data described in rows 2 and 3 of this table 14-20
8. Provided data described in rows 2 and 4 of this table 11-15
9. Provided data described in rows 2 and 5 of this table 30-35
10. Provided data described in rows 2 and 6 of this table 14-20
* Numbers sometime appear as ranges in this column due to participants completing
some outcome measures and not completing others.
Table 3.2 Pain intensity scores (NRSpain intensity: all n's = 38)
Variable name Mean Standard Skew. S.E. of Kurtosis S.E. of
dev. skew Kurtosis
Pain 1 7.47 1.45 0.05 0.31 0.14 0.61
Pain 2 6.84 1.82 -0.01 0.38 -0.30 0.75
Pain Change -0.63* 1.84 0.74 0.38 1.02 0.75
*
p<0.05
The average self-efficacy scores at the beginning of the programme were 25.5 and
these increased to 31.8 by the end of the programme (see Table 3.3). This difference
was statistically significant (t = 3.49, df = 37, p<0.001, one tailed) and supported
hypothesis 1. The standardised mean difference was equal to a Cohen's g of 0.49.
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Table 3.3 Self-efficacy scores (PSEQ: Nicholas, 1988: all n's = 38)






Self-Efficacy 1 25.5 10.7 0.35 0.31 -0.30 0.61
Self-Efficacy 2 31.8 14.9 0.36 0.38 -1.08 0.75
Self-Efficacy 6.28" 11.10 0.58 0.44 0.19 0.75
change
"p<0.01
The average BAI score at the beginning of the programme was 17.5, which
decreased to 14.8 by the end of the programme (see Table 3.4). This difference was
statistically significant (t = 2.49, df = 36, p<0.01, one tailed) and supported
hypothesis 1. The standardised mean difference was equivalent to a Cohen's g of
0.23.
The mean BDI-II score at the start of the programme was 21.4, which reduced to
18.0 by the end of treatment (see Table 3.4). This difference was statistically
significant (t = 2.61, df = 36, p< 0.01) and supported hypothesis 1. The standardised
mean difference was equivalent to a Cohen's g of 0.30.
Table 3.4 Mood scores (BAI, Beck et al., 1988; BDI-II, Beck et al., 1996: n = 37)






BAI lf 17.5 12.0 -0.45 0.31 -0.15 0.62
BAI 2f 14.8 11.8 -0.40 0.38 -0.81 0.75
BAI change -2.73" 8.47 -0.07 0.41 0.92 0.80
BDI-II 1 21.4 10.6 0.22 0.31 -0.64 0.62
BDI-II 2 18.0 11.9 0.53 0.38 -0.49 0.75
BDI-II change -3.40** 8.40 0.60 0.41 1.01 0.80
t The BAI scores were transformed in order to reduce skewness. However, the
untransformed mean and standard deviation values are given here alongside the
transformed skewness and kurtosis statistics. p<0.01
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The Pain Stages of Change Questionnaire produces four sub-scales. The time 1, time
2, and change scores for these sub-scales are given in Table 3.5.
Table 3.5 Pain Stages of Change Scores (PSCQ: Kerns et al., 1997: all n's = 34)






PSCQ-PC1 2.64 0.81 0.47 0.32 -0.02 0.63
PSCQ-C1 4.26 0.59 -0.43 0.32 -0.24 0.62
PSCQ-A1 3.02 0.95 -0.01 0.32 -0.53 0.63
PSCQM1 3.12 0.86 -0.19 0.32 -0.57 0.63
PSCQ-PC2 2.13 0.96 0.71 0.39 -0.33 0.76
PSCQ-C2 4.04 0.68 -0.20 0.39 -0.92 0.76
PSCQ-A2 3.98 0.70 -0.42 0.39 -0.46 0.76




-0.51 0.63 0.11 0.40 0.14 0.79
PSCQ-C change -0.22* 0.76 -0.58 0.39 1.07 0.77
PSCQ-A change 0.96*** 1.02 0.21 0.40 -0.41 0.79
PSCQ-M change 1.02*** 0.66 0.48 0.40 0.49 0.79
PC = pre-contemplation; C = contemplation; A = action; M = maintenance
*p<0.05; ***p<0.001
The average Pre-Contemplation sub-scale score at the beginning of the programme
was 2.64, which was reduced (in line with expectations) to 2.13 by the end of the
programme. This difference was statistically significant (t = 4.74, df = 33, p<0.001,
one tailed) and supported hypothesis 1. The standardised mean difference was
equivalent to a Cohen's g of 0.57. The mean Contemplation score at the beginning of
the programme was 4.26, which was reduced to 4.04 by the end of treatment. This
difference was statistically significant (t = 1.73, df = 35, p<0.05, one tailed) and
supported hypothesis 1. The standardised mean difference was equivalent to a
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Cohen's g of 0.35. The average Action score was 3.02, which increased to 3.98 by
the end of the programme. This difference was statistically significant (t = 5.44, df =
33, p<0.001, one tailed) and supported hypothesis 1. The standardised mean
difference was equivalent to a Cohen's g of 0.97. The mean Maintenance score at the
beginning of treatment was 3.12, which increased by the end of treatment to 4.14.
This difference was statistically significant (t = 8.97, df = 33, p<0.001, one tailed)
and supported hypothesis 1. The standardised mean difference was equivalent to a
Cohen's g of 1.42.
The descriptive statistics for the physiotherapist measures of physical functioning are
given in Table 3.6.
Table 3.6 Physical functioning scores (Walking distance and number ofsit-to-
stands in 2 minutes; Harding et al., 1994: all n's = 35)
Variable name Mean Standard Skew. S.E. of Kurtosis S.E. of
dev. skew. Kurtosis
Walk l1 120.9 60.7 -0.10 0.31 -0.08 0.61
Walk 21 133.7 60.4 -0.34 0.39 -0.04 0.77
Sit to stand 1 16.5 8.24 0.40 0.31 -0.51 0.61
Sit to stand 2 22.1 12.1 0.55 0.39 -0.17 0.77
Change walk1'1' 12.8** 17.7 -0.38 0.41 0.56 0.81
Change s-s11
***
5.6 5.86 0.03 0.41 0.80 0.80
1 The walk variables were transformed in order to reduce skewness. However, the
untransformed mean and standard deviation values are given here alongside the
transformed skewness and kurtosis statistics.
1 The change scores showed extremely significant skewness and kurtosis statistics.
Natural log transformations were not able to improve the distribution of these
variables. An outlier analysis suggested that there were 2 or 3 extreme values. These
values were removed and the 'trimmed' variables were more normally distributed.
p<0.01, p<0.01
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The average distance walked in 2 minutes at the start of the programme was 120.9
metres, which increased to 133.7 metres by the end of treatment. This difference was
statistically significant (t - 2.52, df = 34, p<0.01, one tailed) and supported
hypothesis 1. The standardised mean difference was equivalent to a Cohen's g of
0.21. The average number of'sit-to-stand' manoeuvres accomplished in 2 minutes at
the start of the programme was 16.5, which increased to 22.1 by the end of the
programme. This difference was statistically significant (t = 3.73, df = 34, p<0.001,
one tailed) and supported hypothesis 1. The standardised mean difference was
equivalent to a Cohen's g of 0.55.
The average disability score at the beginning of the programme was 14.2, which
decreased to 13.3 by the end of treatment (see Table 3.7). This difference was not
statistically significant (/ = 1.56, df = 37, p=0.06, one tailed) and did not support
hypothesis 1. The standardised mean difference was equivalent to a Cohen's g of
0.17.
Table 3.7 Disability scores (SIP-SF: Roland andMorris, 1983: all n's = 38) scores






SIP-SF 1 14.2 4.93 -0.13 0.31 -0.68 0.61
SIP-SF 2 13.3 5.50 -0.29 0.38 -0.67 0.75
SIP-SF change -0.90 3.54 -0.03 0.38 -0.28 0.75
Finally, the average TSK score at the beginning of treatment was 19.3, which
decreased by the end of the programme to 16.5 (see Table 3.8). This change was
statistically significant (t = 2.71, df = 36, p<0.01, one tailed) and supported
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hypothesis 1. The standardised mean difference was equivalent to a Cohen's g of
0.29.
Table 3.8 Fear of (re-)injury (TSK: Kori et al., 1990: all n's = 37)
Variable name Mean Standard Skew. S.E. of Kurtosis S.E. of
dev. skew. Kurtosis
TSK 1 19.3 9.73 0.33 0.31 -0.45 0.62
TSK 2 16.5 9.38 0.48 0.38 -0.57 0.75
TSK change -2.8" 6.19 -0.19 0.39 0.77 0.76
"p<0.01
With the exception of changes in disability scores, all of the tests of hypothesis 1
were statistically significant in the direction that supported the hypothesis.
A correlation matrix, displaying the associations between the outcome variables is
given in Appendix XVII.
The descriptive statistics for the schema variables are given in Tables 3.9 to 3.12.
Table 3.9 shows the descriptive statistics for participants' own YSQ-SF schema
domain scores. Unfortunately, there are no published studies giving norms for these
measures and it is therefore impossible to determine how extreme or moderate these
score are. As the schema domains are comprised of different numbers of items it is
not easy to make comparisons across the 5 sets of scores. However, if the
'Disconnection/Rejection' score is divided by 2.5 (which yields a score of 24.0) and
the score for 'Impaired Autonomy' is divided by 2 (producing a score of 20.3) these
are then on the same metric as the other three sets of scores. This makes it clear that
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the 'Over-vigilance/Inhibition' score is the highest and the 'Impaired Autonomy' score
is the lowest of the five sub-scale scores.
Table 3.9 Participant YSQ-SF scores (all N's = 32).
Variable name Mean Standard Skew. S.E. of Kurtosis S.E. of
(alpha) dev. skew. Kurtosis
Discon./Reject. 59.9 24.4 0.31 0.41 -1.14 0.81
(0.93)
Imp. Autonomy^ 40.6 18.2 0.38 0.41 -0.64 0.81
(0.91)
Impaired Limits^ 24.7 8.1 0.23 0.41 -0.38 0.81
(0.78)
Other-Direct. 27.0 9.4 0.28 0.41 -0.65 0.81
(0.85)
Overvig./Inhib. 32.1 10.0 0.46 0.41 -0.32 0.81
(0.84)
^ These variables were skewed and therefore natural log transformations were used to
produce distributions that were approximately normal. The untransformed means and
standard deviations, however, are reported here.
Table 3.10 (below) presents the scores for Informant scores for the YSQ-SF.
Table 3.10 Informant YSQ-SF scores (all N's = 25).
Variable name Mean Standard Skew. S.E. of Kurtosis S.E. of
(alpha) dev. skew. Kurtosis
Discon./Reject. 59.9 22.2 0.64 0.46 -0.00 0.90
(0.93)
Imp. Autonomy 41.2 15.4 0.56 0.46 -0.72 0.90
(0.91)
Impaired Limits* 28.4 9.0 0.66 0.46 1.27 0.90
(0.78)
Other-Direct. 30.6 10.6 -0.07 0.46 -0.96 0.90
(0.85)
Overvig./Inhib. 29.6 9.9 0.18 0.46 -0.54 0.90
(0.84)
* This variables was skewed and therefore a natural log transformation was used to
produce a distribution that was approximately normal. The untransformed mean and
standard deviation, however, is reported here.
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Conducting a similar transformation on the first two informant-reported schema
domain scores yields adjusted totals of 24.0 and 20.6, respectively. This suggests that
the 'Other-Directedness' score is the highest (with the 'Over-vigilance/Inhibition'
score that was highest among the self-reported scores, being slightly less and next
highest) and the 'Impaired Autonomy' score also being the lowest of the five sub-
scale scores.
Scores on psychologist ratings of the five schema domains are given in Table 3.11.
Table 3.11 Psychologist ratings of the five YSQ-SF domains (all N's = 54).
Variable name Mean Standard Skew. S.E. of Kurtosis S.E. of
(alpha) dev. skew. Kurtosis
Discon./Reject. 2.43 1.02 -0.04 0.32 -0.89 0.63
Imp. Autonomy 1.87 0.97 -0.40 0.32 -0.72 0.63
Impaired Limits^ 1.70 0.99 -0.48 0.32 -0.78 0.63
Other-Direct. 2.10 0.88 -0.44 0.32 -0.41 0.63
Overvig./Inhib. 2.28 0.96 -0.20 0.32 -0.85 0.63
Interestingly, the pattern of scores in Table 3.11 is unlike that of the self or informant
reported YSQ-SF schema domain scores. The highest rating is given to the
'Disconnection /Rejection' domain, whilst the lowest rating is given to the 'Impaired
Limits' domain.
The self-reported DAS scores are given in Table 3.12 (below). These scores are all
comprised of the same number of items and therefore are easily compared. The
highest DAS sub-scale was that measuring the importance of 'Self-control' beliefs
whilst the lowest score was found for 'Achievement' beliefs. It is worth noting that
the scores achieved by this sample of chronic pain patients are comparable with those
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recorded for depressed patients and their relatives and are higher than those from a
sample of General Practice patients (Power et al., 1994).
Table 3.12 DAS sub-scale scores (all N's = 31).
Variable name Mean Standard Skew. S.E. of Kurtosis S.E. of
(alpha) dev. skew. Kurtosis
Achievement 27.2 10.7 0.59 0.42 0.31 0.82
(0.89)
Dependency 28.7 9.1 0.30 0.42 -0.81 0.82
(0.71)
Self-control 31.5 9.1 -0.43 0.42 -0.75 0.82
(0.77)
Further analyses were conducted examining the relationships between these various
schema measures. The results are too detailed to go into here but can be found in
Appendix XVIII. It is worth pointing out, however, that the associations between the
different measures of the same schema domain were often weak and statistically non¬
significant.
3.2 Relationships between schemata and outcome from the pain management
programme (tests of hypotheses 2, 3, 4, and 5)
Examining the associations between the various schema measures and patient
outcomes from the pain management programme provided tests of Hypotheses 2, 3,
4 and 5. Because of the small sample sizes, these associations were calculated using
Spearman's rho. Whether a correlation coefficient is in the direction that supports
these hypotheses or not depends on the particular dependent variable in the analysis.
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The following list indicates whether it is a positive or a negative correlation that is
supportive of the hypotheses.










Change sit to stand -ve
SIP change +ve
TSK change +ve
The first test involved examining the relationship between scores on the self-
completion YSQ-SF and patient outcomes and provides a test of hypothesis 2 (see
Table 3.13). As none of these correlation coefficients were significant at the 0.004
alpha level (indeed, none were statistically significant at the more conventional 0.05
alpha level) hypothesis 2 is rejected.
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Table 3.13. The relationship between schema domains on the self-completion
YSQ-SF and patient outcomes from the Pain Management Programme










Pain Change (18) 0.23 0.10 0.07 -0.18 -0.11
Self-Efficacy change (14) -0.46 -0.34 -0.09 -0.07 -0.12
BAI change (18) 0.03 0.17 0.18 0.26 -0.02
BDI-II change (18) -0.15 0.22 0.16 -0.40 0.03
PSCQ-PC change (20) 0.20 0.29 0.38 0.03 -0.01
PSCQ-C change (20) -0.13 -0.22 -0.26 0.01 0.02
PSCQ-A change (19) -0.01 -0.05 -0.01 0.19 -0.12
PSCQ-M change (19) 0.19 0.15 -0.19 0.15 0.02
Change walk (20) 0.00 -0.04 -0.04 0.18 0.31
Change sit to stand (19) 0.13 -0.15 -0.24 0.16 -0.07
SIP change (21) 0.10 -0.02 -0.12 -0.07 0.18
TSK change (21) 0.14 0.19 0.14 -0.15 0.26
Average correlation 0.06 0.12 0.13 -0.19 0.04
The five average correlation coefficients (weighted by sample size) were all small
and did not consistently favour the research hypothesis. A post-hoc power analysis,
using the largest of the positively signed coefficients (from the four that favoured the
study hypothesis) suggested that a sample size of 372 participants would be needed
for this relationship to be statistically significant at the 0.05 alpha level (with a power
of 0.9). Of interest is the fact that the same analysis suggested that only 174
participants are required for the single negative correlation to statistically significant
at the same power and alpha level.
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Next hypothesis 3 was examined by computing the associations between the
informant reported YSQ-SF schema domains and the treatment outcome variables
were examined. These are presented in Table 3.14.
Table 3.14. The relationship between schema domains on the informant-
completion YSQ-SF and patient outcomes from the Pain Management
Programme










Pain Change (15) -0.16 -0.49 -0.47 -0.36 -0.17
Self-Efficacy change (11) -0.05 -0.23 -0.32 0.15 0.21
BAI change (12) -0.05 0.11 0.63 -0.05 0.26
BDI-II change (12) -0.42 -0.22 -0.03 -0.64* -0.20
PSCQ-PC change (15) 0.07 -0.40 0.12 -0.72+ 0.08
PSCQ-C change (15) -0.33 -0.03 0.31 0.06 -0.07
PSCQ-A change (15) -0.09 0.16 0.36 0.18 -0.07
PSCQ-M change (15) 0.14 0.15 0.11 -0.04 0.07
Change walk (15) -0.34 -0.37 -0.17 -0.05 -0.04
Change sit to stand (13) 0.78+ 0.54 0.28 0.50 0.04
SIP change (15) -0.19 -0.06 -0.01 -0.25 -0.13
TSK change (15) -0.28 0.08 0.08 -0.48 0.06
Average correlation -0.08 -0.10 -0.04 -0.27 -0.02
*
p<0.05, " p<0.01+ p<0.004
There are two correlation coefficients that are statistically significant at the more
conservative alpha level. However, both of these coefficients were in the opposite
direction to that predicted by hypothesis 3. One of these two significant associations
found that PSCQ-PC scores were reduced most in those patients who scored most
highly on the 'Other Directedness' schema domain of the informant-completed YSQ-
SF. The other significant association indicated that higher scores on informant
reports of the schema domain of'Disconnection/Rejection' were associated with a
greater degree of gain in the number of sit to stand movements that patients were
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able to complete following treatment. Of course, even though these associations were
significant at the adjusted alpha level, they were just two out of the sixty that were
tested and therefore hypothesis 3 is also rejected.
The average weighted correlation coefficients in this analysis were all negatively
signed (that is, in the opposite direction to the hypothesis). Post-hoc power analyses
using the largest of these coefficients suggested that a sample size of 104 participants
would be needed for this relationship to be statistically significant at the 0.05 alpha
level (with a power of 0.9). It is perhaps worth noting that the largest association in
this analysis is the same as that in the previous analysis (between the schema domain
of 'Other-Directedness' and patient outcome), and both are negatively signed.
Hypothesis 4 was tested by computing the associations between the psychologist
ratings of the schema domains and the patient outcome variables (see Table 3.15).
This table shows that no relationships were statistically significant at the 0.004 alpha
level. The average correlation coefficients in this analysis were so small as to not
merit a post-hoc power analysis.
Before rejecting hypothesis 4, these same relationships were examined in a series of
partial correlation analyses where the effects of the psychologists' predictions of
likely patient outcomes were removed (see Table 3.16). This had the effect of
making one of the relationships (between psychologist ratings of the schema domain
of'Impaired Limits' and the TSK) statistically significant at the conservative 0.004
alpha level. However, as in the previous analysis, the coefficient was in the opposite
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direction to that predicted by the study hypothesis and, therefore, hypothesis 4 was
rejected.
Table 3.15. Correlation coefficients representing the relationship between
psychologist ratings of the five schema domains and patient outcomes from the
pain management programme.










Pain Change (35) -0.31 -0.35* -0.16 -0.31 -0.39*
Self-Efficacy change (35) -0.21 -0.15 -0.19 -0.16 -0.21
BAI change (30) 0.22 0.10 0.01 0.04 0.19
BDI-II change (30) 0.18 0.31 -0.12 0.06 0.19
PSCQ-PC change (32) 0.12 -0.02 0.21 0.17 -0.12
PSCQ-C change (33) -0.12 0.12 -0.18 0.01 0.07
PSCQ-A change (32) -0.02 -0.09 -0.08 0.21 0.25
PSCQ-M change (32) 0.11 0.11 0.03 0.37* 0.29
Change walk (30) -0.06 0.09 -0.19 -0.15 0.14
Change sit to stand (31) 0.03 0.06 0.03 -0.03 -0.05
SIP change(35) 0.20 0.01 0.16 0.22 0.15
TSK change (34) 0.03 0.16 -0.39* 0.05 -0.11
Average correlation 0.05 -0.00 0.02 -0.01 -0.06
*
p<0.05
As found previously, the average correlation coefficients were all small and again it
was not felt that these merited a post-hoc power analysis.
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Table 3.16. Correlation coefficients representing the relationship between
psychologist ratings of the five schema domains and patient outcomes from the
pain management programme, adjusted for psychologists' outcome prediction
scores










Pain Change (32) -0.17 -0.24 -0.04 -0.26 -0.35
Self-Efficacy change (30) -0.19 -0.18 -0.20 -0.14 -0.15
BAI change (27) 0.06 -0.05 -0.14 -0.02 0.13
BDI-II change (27) -0.07 0.14 -0.36 -0.02 -0.12
PSCQ-PC change (29) -0.05 -0.17 0.11 0.12 -0.19
PSCQ-C change (30) 0.05 0.29 -0.07 0.07 0.14
PSCQ-A change (29) 0.03 -0.06 -0.05 0.23 0.28
PSCQ-M change (29) -0.03 -0.01 -0.09 0.34 0.25
Change walk (27) 0.12 0.26 -0.08 -0.10 0.22
Change sit to stand (28) 0.06 0.09 0.05 -0.02 -0.04
SIP change(32) 0.06 -0.12 0.06 0.18 0.10
TSK change (31) 0.18 0.18 -0.47* -0.13 0.02
Average correlation -0.00 -0.05 -0.01 -0.04 -0.11
+ p<0.004
Finally, hypothesis 5 was tested by computing the relationships between the DAS
schemata and the variables measuring patient outcomes from the pain management
programme. These results are presented in Table 3.17. This produced one statistically
significant correlation coefficient (between the DAS schema of 'Achievement' and
the change in the number of sit to stands performed in 2 minutes). Furthermore, the
direction of this association indicated that the more strongly patients held these
'Achievement' attitudes the less treatment gains they made in this aspect of physical
functioning. More importantly, this association was in line with hypothesis 5.
However, as this was one significant association out of the 36 that were tested,
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hypothesis 5 is rejected. Furthermore, the average correlation coefficients were all
very small, and did not warrant a post-hoc power analysis.
Table 3.17. The relationship between DAS sub-scale scores and patient
outcomes from the pain management programme
Outcome variables (n's) Achievement Dependency Self-control
Pain Change (20) 0.07 0.07 0.06
Self-Efficacy change (14) 0.05 -0.14 -0.14
BAI change (17) 0.22 0.17 -0.47*
BDI-II change (17) 0.40 0.38 0.15
PSCQ-PC change (19) -0.06 -0.32 0.05
PSCQ-C change (20) 0.02 0.16 -0.34
PSCQ-A change (19) 0.25 0.36 -0.11
PSCQ-M change (19) 0.37 0.22 0.32
Change walk (19) 0.17 0.21 0.07
Change sit to stand (19) -0.65+ -0.49** -0.28
SIP change (20) -0.05 0.04 0.05
TSK change (20) 0.06 -0.23 0.17
Average correlation 0.02 -0.04 0.04
*
p<0.05 ** p<0.01+ p<0.004
3.3 Further analyses (tests of hypothesis 6)
As these analyses failed to provide support for the study hypothesis, further analyses
were conducted to investigate why this might have been the case. It was theorised
that this failure to find significant associations between the schema variables and
patient outcomes may be due to the large proportion of individuals who failed to
complete the follow-up data (and who were therefore excluded from the analysis). It
is possible that this depleted sample somehow biased the data in favour of the null
hypothesis. For example, it may be that those who failed to complete (and in some
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cases, dropped out completely from) the treatment programme, were the individuals
for whom the study hypothesis was most true. If this were the case, it would be
necessary to demonstrate that these 'non-completers' have high schema scores and
also have a poor outcome from the programme. Obviously, it is impossible to test
this prediction, as it would require outcome data that are not available. However, it is
possible, in some cases, to test the first part of this hypothesis by comparing the
schema scores of these individuals with those who did complete the end of
programme measures. This was done in two ways. Firstly, the four sets of schema
scores (self-complete YSQ-SF and DAS, informant completed YSQ-SF, and
psychologist ratings of the YSQ-SF schema domains) of the 'completers' and the
'non-completers' were compared using independent /-tests. Secondly, in a more
general test, these schema scores were correlated with the number of sessions the
patient attended (using Spearman's rho, as the number of sessions variable was
highly skewed).
Table 3.18. A comparison of scores on the five schema domains from the
patients' self-reports, between 'completers' and 'non-completers'
completers non-completers
(n=21) (n=l 1)
mean s.d. mean s.d. t P
Disconnection/Rejection 57.6 27.1 64.3 18.7 0.73 ns
Impaired Autonomy* 39.8 18.9 42.2 17.7 0.44 ns
Impaired Limits 23.7 7.03 26.5 10.0 0.75 ns
Other Directedness 26.3 9.96 28.2 8.4 0.52 ns
Over-Vigilance/Inhibition 32.1 9.88 32.0 10.7 0.04 ns
* These variables were transformed using natural log scores as the original variables
were skewed
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The results did not support this hypothesis. Of the 18 tests of this hypothesis (given
in Tables 3.18 to 3.21), only 2 showed statistically significant differences. Both of
these concerned DAS sub-scale scores and both were in the opposite direction to that
predicted (that is, 'completers' had higher scores than 'non-completers').
Table 3.19. A comparison of scores on the five schema domains from the
informants' reports, between 'completers' and 'non-completers'
completers non-completers
(n=05) (n=TO)
mean s.d. mean s.d. t P
Disconnection/Rejection 55.8 21.2 66.1 23.4 0.26 ns
Impaired Autonomy 39.9 13.8 43.3 18.11 0.60 ns
Impaired Limits^ 30.1 10.3 26.0 6.4 1.10 ns
Other Directedness 29.9 10.6 31.7 11.0 0.40 ns
Over-Vigilance/Inhibition 30.6 11.8 26.0 6.4 0.68 ns
T This variables was transformed using natural log scores as the original variables
were skewed
Table 3.20. A comparison of psychologist ratings of the five schema domains
between 'completers' and 'non-completers'
completers non-completers
(n==34) (n==19)
mean s.d. mean s.d. t P
Disconnection/Rejection 2.40 0.98 2.47 1.12 0.25 ns
Impaired Autonomy 1.89 0.99 1.86 0.96 0.10 ns
Impaired Limits 1.63 0.91 1.81 1.12 0.66 ns
Other Directedness 2.00 0.85 2.30 0.92 1.21 ns
Over-Vigilance/Inhibition 2.24 0.90 2.35 1.04 0.42 ns
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mean s.d. mean s.d. t P
Achievement 31.1 10.4 20.3 7.5 3.03 0.005
Dependency 29.9 9.9 26.5 7.4 -0.98 ns
Self-control 34.1 7.6 26.6 9.8 2.37 0.025
It could also not be demonstrated that the number of treatment sessions attended was
significantly related to any of the four sets of schema data (see Table 3.22).
Finally, It was hypothesised that those patients who did not complete the YSQ-SF
and DAS self-completion questionnaires may also have been the individuals with the
highest levels of dysfunctional schemata. If this was the case, it may have biased the
results against finding significant relationships between the YSQ-SF/DAS and
patient outcomes. This possibility was investigated by comparing the psychologist
ratings of the five schema domains across the two groups of patients who completed
the self-report schema data. The results are presented in Table 3.23. This series of
independent /-tests revealed only one statistically significant difference. On this
occasion this supported the hypothesis that those who failed to take part in the study
had higher schema domain scores (in this case they scored more highly on the
domain of'Impaired Limits'.
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Table 3.22. The relationships between schema scores and the number of pain















-0.22 -0.14 -0.03 -0.10 0.10
Informant YSQ-SF 0.19 0.24 0.02 0.27 0.10
(n=26)
Psychologist ratings -0.19 -0.01 -0.10 0.24 0.16
(n=54)
Achievement Dependency Self-control
DAS (n=30) -0.13 -0.25 -0.18
Table 3.23. A comparison of psychologist ratings of the five schema domains
between self-reported YSQ-SF 'completers' and 'non-completers'
completers non-completers
(n=30) (n=23)
mean s.d. mean s.d. t P
Disconnection/Rejection 2.36 0.99 2.48 1.01 0.44 ns
Impaired Autonomy 1.96 0.92 1.80 1.03 0.85 ns
Impaired Limits 1.46 0.95 1.90 0.99 2.34 0.023
Other Directedness 2.08 0.80 2.14 0.97 0.27 ns
Over-Vigilance/Inhibition 2.23 0.81 2.34 1.09 0.35 ns





4.1. Discussion of results.
This study failed to find consistent evidence that dysfunctional schemata were related
to patient outcomes from a pain management programme. Before discussing why this
might have been the case, it is worth recapping the results and examining the few
significant associations that were found.
The patients' own self-reports of the five YSQ-SF schema domains were not
statistically significantly related to any of the 12 outcomes from the treatment
programme. When it came to the informant's reports of the schema domains, only
two of these were reliably associated with the patients' outcomes, and both of these
were in the direction opposite to that which was hypothesised. The first of these two
significant associations was that between 'Other Directedness' and changes in PSCQ
pre-contemplation scores. The pain management programme aims to move
individuals on from the stage of pre-contemplation, to thinking about, and actively
changing, their behaviour. Consequently, successful engagement with the
programme should see a reduction in pre-contemplation scores on the PSCQ. The
large inverse association that was found suggested that these scores were reduced
most in those patients who, according to their family member of friend, were
excessively focused on the wishes and desires of others. Whilst it is important to
remember that this was one of only a few significant associations found out ofmany
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that were tested, this was a large association that met the more stringent requirements
of the alpha level that was adjusted using Bonferroni's correction. Furthermore, it is
not difficult to produce a post-hoc rationalisation for this finding. It is possible to
argue that those individuals who scored highly on 'Other-Directedness' were also
those who were most open to social influences, like those coming from the therapists
in the group programme. For example, the patients in the pain management groups
would have been fully aware of the attitudes of the group facilitators towards the
self-management of pain. Therefore, patients who were overly concerned with the
happiness of others may have endorsed fewer pre-contemplation items in order to
satisfy their therapists.
The other significant association between informant reports of patients' schemata and
outcome was that between 'Disconnection/Rejection and changes in the number of sit
to stand movements made in two minutes. This was a large, positive, association,
which suggests that those highest in this schema show the greatest improvements in
this aspect of physical functioning. Individuals who score highly on this schema
domain are thought to hold the belief that their needs for safety will not be met in a
reliable way. As, it is thought that these individuals see others as untrustworthy, it is
surprising that they appear to make gains in this area of physical functioning, when it
is probably important to trust the therapist that these gains can be made without
putting oneself at risk of further injury. One possibility is that these patients strive to
make tangible gains in order to avoid rejection from therapists who they may
perceive as critical and judgmental. Flowever, this is a post-hoc speculation for what
may simply be a chance finding.
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The next set of analyses involved the association between the psychologists' ratings
of the YSQ schema domains and patients' outcomes. In the bivariate analyses, none
of these associations were statistically significant. However, when the effects of the
psychologists' ratings of the patients' likely outcome were partialled out, one
association became statistically significant. This was the association between the
schema domain of'Impaired Limits' and change in the patients' fear of injuring or re-
injuring themselves, as measured by the difference in pre and post-group scores on
the TSK. This schema domain is theorised to be concerned with a sense of
entitlement and insufficient self-control or self-discipline. This association is
interesting because Young and Behary (1998) have suggested that individuals who
hold this belief are likely to have had a childhood where they were not pushed to
tolerate discomfort. If this suggestion were true it might also be reasonable to expect
these individuals to have high TSK scores, the reasoning being that their avoidance
of discomfort in early life may have also led them to fear pain. Indeed a post-hoc
analysis reveals that the psychologist ratings of this domain are positively and
significantly associated with both pre and post-group TSK scores (0.39, n=49,
p<0.01 and 0.45, n=35, p<0.01, respectively). These significant associations suggest
that this schema domain may be confounded with the TSK variable that is used to
measure patients' outcomes. Furthermore, it may also help to explain why the
association between this schema domain and reductions in TSK scores, which is in
the direction that is counter to that hypothesised, was a significant one. This kind of
confounding of independent and dependent variables can sometimes lead to
unexpected findings. In this case, the suggestion that this association may be
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spurious is given further support by the fact that high pre-group TSK scores are
associated with the greatest reduction in TSK scores following treatment (-0.37,
n=37, p<0.05, see the correlation matrix of dependent variables in Appendix X). This
association, between pre-group TSK scores and changes in TSK scores, may simply
be due to the fact that there is more room in which to make reductions when scores
are high to begin with. When all of these points are taken together, it is possible to
argue that the association between 'Impaired Limits' and TSK reductions may be due
to the fact that these variables may, in some part, be measuring the same thing.
The final statistically significant association between schemata and outcome from the
pain management programme was between the DAS measure of'Achievement'
beliefs and change in the timed number of sit to stand movements. This association
was in the direction predicted by the hypothesis, in that the more that the participants
held the belief that success is important, the less gain they made in this aspect of their
physical performance. In the introduction it was hypothesised that individuals who
held these achievement beliefs would find it difficult to adopt a pacing approach. It
was theorised that such persons would be uncomfortable at taking a slow and
measured approach to attaining their goals, as they might interpret partial success as
indicating failure. Furthermore, it was suggested that any setbacks during treatment
would be perceived as a sign of failure, and that this perception might undermine
their motivation to engage with the treatment process. However, this rationale should
also apply to progress in the number of yards walked following treatment. As this
wasn't significantly associated with the 'Disconnection/Rejection' schema domain it
must undermine the credibility of this single significant association.
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It is also important to consider this single success against the background of the
general failure of the hypothesis. If the hypothesis is correct, then there should have
been more significant associations in these analyses. Generally, when a hypothesis is
rejected, as this one surely must be given the overall lack of support, this can mean
only one of two things. It may mean that the hypothesis is incorrect, or it may be that
the design of the study is flawed in ways that prevent the truth of the hypothesis from
being detected. Section 4.2 (below) will examine what substantive factors may have
been at work that could have undermined the hypothesised mechanisms. Following
that discussion, possible flaws in the study design, that may have prevented the
hypothesised relationships being found, will be examined.
Before examining the merits of the hypothesis and problems with the study design,
another aspect of the results is worth examining. This study employed the patients'
own self-reports, the reports of informants (a family member or friend) and
psychologist ratings, as measures of the YSQ schema domains. It will have been
clear from the results described above that none of these measures stood out as being
more strongly related to patient outcome than were any other. This finding could be
the result of a number of processes. One reason that no measure outperformed any
other could be that they were all measuring the same thing. However, this
explanation is undermined by the fact that there was a general lack of association
between these different measures of the schema domains. There are fifteen
correlation coefficients that represent the associations between the three sets (self,
informant and psychologist ratings) of schema domain measures (see Appendix X).
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Of these fifteen, only two are statistically significant at the 0.05 alpha level. This
poor level of agreement between these different measures suggests a further two
possibilities. It may suggest that the different sources for the schema domain ratings
were producing ratings that were not measures of the same concepts. That is, these
ratings were invalid because they were systematically biased. Some evidence that
supports this explanation is the fact that the psychologists' ratings were correlated
with their predictions of the patients' likely outcome from treatment. This suggests
that, in the psychologists' minds, there was a confounding between the schema
domains and patients' likely treatment success. Unfortunately, no further information
was collected from the family and friend informants and so no such biases could be
examined within their ratings. An alternative explanation is that the three different
raters were in fact making ratings of the same concepts, but that they were simply not
doing so with any real degree of accuracy. There was some evidence that this might
have been the case with the psychologists' ratings in that the inter-rater reliability
estimates (presented in Table 2.3) were not impressive. It should be remembered that
the psychologists were asked to make ratings of complex schema domains, but were
limited by only having five single items on which to make these judgements. As
regards the patients' own and their informants' responses, one possible reason why
these were only weakly associated with each other may be that the general public are
not very astute judges of peoples' personalities. Asking three different groups to
make ratings of an individual's personality and cognitive structures was an attempt to
counter the possible biases that are felt to be present in studies that rely solely on
self-reports. Unfortunately, because of possible weaknesses in these measures
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(problems with the YSQ-SF will be discussed later, see Section 4.3) this approach
was not very fruitful.
4.2. A critical examination of the study hypothesis.
In the Introduction there were a number of suggestions concerning how the
dysfunctional schemata that were the focus of this study might interfere with
rehabilitation. This section will examine whether or not it is possible that these
schemata might actually aid some patients, in some circumstances, in their
rehabilitation. One set of beliefs that might increase a patient's own self-management
efforts are those associated with the 'Over-vigilance/Inhibition' schema domain of the
YSQ-SF and the Achievement sub-scale of the DAS. Both of these sets of belief
concern the strength with which a person values achievement and how unwilling
they are to tolerate a poor performance from themselves. The Introduction spelt out
how these might be dysfunctional in a treatment setting, such as a pain management
programme that emphasised a paced approach to recovering functionality. However,
it is reasonable to suggest that people who hold these convictions might be driven to
strive for success in the face of adversity. On the other hand, others who do not
possess these beliefs might give up with treatment if it becomes difficult. Clearly, if
both these processes operate, the net result would be that individuals with strong
achievement beliefs would obtain an outcome that was roughly equal to those
without these beliefs.
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A similar logic could be employed to argue that those who have the belief that they
cannot cope alone (as measured by the Dependency sub-scale of the DAS and the
'Impaired Autonomy and Performance' sub-scale of the YSQ-SF) might do
particularly well in a group treatment programme. It could be argued that such
individuals might perceive the group environment as supportive and therefore
flourish. Unfortunately, it is all too easy to produce, in this post-hoc fashion, a whole
set of counter-arguments that posit mechanisms that work in the direction opposite to
that hypothesised in the Introduction to this study. If there are competing processes at
work, some of which being helpful to rehabilitation and others damaging, then
treatment process research might be one way of uncovering them. However, given
that this study suggests that these schemata are not harmful to patients' outcome from
pain management, then it would not seem necessary to conduct such a study. Unless,
that is, this study failed because there are design problems with the study that if
corrected would lead to a more favourable outcome for the hypothesis.
There is another explanation as to why this study failed and it is one that might
undermine the whole rationale on which this investigation was based. This
alternative explanation is derived from the work that has examined the role that
dysfunctional schemata play in the development of psychological disorder. These
schemata were originally conceptualised as being vulnerability factors for the
development of depression (Beck, 1967; Weissman, 1979). Supporting this argument
have been studies reporting higher levels of these beliefs among depressed
individuals (for example, Nelson, Stem and Cicchetti, 1992). However, the early
optimism about the predictive and explanatory value of these hypothesised
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vulnerability factors has been damaged by the finding that, following treatment, the
levels of dysfunctional beliefs usually return to that found in comparison controls
(see Power, 1990, for a review). This has led to a great deal of debate about whether
scores on these measures actually represent an individual's stable beliefs or whether
they are more indicative of a person's current emotional state (Charlton and Power,
1995).
This same kind of debate has not taken place about those beliefs that are thought to
be related to the Axis II disorders. This is understandable, as these disorders are
concerned with an individual's personality, which by most definitions is regarded as
stable. Reassuringly, in the chronic pain literature there has been some discussion
about whether the high levels of personality disorder that is found in this population
is truly reflective of long-standing problems in this group. Weisberg, Vittengl, Clark,
Gatchel and Gorin (2000) note that "patients with pain, and their significant others,
often present a very different description of the patient's pre-morbid (before pain
onset) personality function from that observed after the onset of pain." (p. 260). They
suggest that these reports should undermine the diagnosis of an Axis II disorder, but
that it in practice they rarely do. This clinical impression raises questions about how
stable the dysfunctional schemata that were studied here might be in pain patients
who were being treated. One suggestion might be that, as in depression, treatment
could moderate the dysfunctional schemata of patients who have chronic pain. If this
process took place in this sample, it might dissipate the processes that were
hypothesised as likely to interfere with responses to treatment. A future study might
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profit from examining dysfunctional schemata at the end, as well as at the beginning,
of treatment.
4.3. A critical examination of the study design.
Most often when a study fails to detect a significant effect the authors will point out
that the sample size was small and that the tests that were used may, therefore, have
been under-powered. Certainly, in this instance, the sample sizes in the various tests
were small and, in some analyses, very small. However, as has already been pointed
out, the average effect sizes (expressed as average correlation coefficients) were,
with one exception, small. This single exception involved the average correlation
coefficient (of r=-0.27) between the patient-completed YSQ-SF measure of'Other-
Directedness' and patient outcome. According to Cohen (1977) a correlation
coefficient of 0.3 would be described as a moderate effect size, and this particular
coefficient is nearly of that magnitude. However, this association was in the direction
opposite to that predicted. The average correlation coefficients that had a positive
sign (that is, they favoured the hypothesis) were, in the majority of cases, so small as
to require samples numbering in their thousands in order for there to be a good
chance of them being found to be statistically significant. Clearly, the clinical
importance of such small effects would not merit this research being conducted with
these much larger samples. In summary, the findings of the post-hoc power analysis
would suggest that this study did not fail because of the small sample sizes. It failed
because the associations were either not there to be detected, or they were so small as
to be unimportant.
102
However, there are other aspects of the study design that could have caused the
hypothesis to be rejected. One of these potential problems was the numbers of
patients who, for one reason or another, did not complete all the study measures.
There were a number of potential study participants whose outcome from treatment
could not be judged because they did not complete the measures at the start of the
group programme. There was a further loss of participants due to individuals
dropping out of the programme. Some of these were in the early stages of treatment
and had left the group before the psychologists had got a chance to get to know them,
and therefore they were unable to make a proper assessment of their schemata. There
was also a loss of participants from those who failed to complete the end of group
outcome measures and whose outcome from treatment could not be ascertained. A
final group, whose responses could not be analysed, consisted of those who chose not
to complete the measures of dysfunctional schemata or to pass the informant
questionnaires on to a relative or friend. All of these losses of potential study
participants could have biased the sample in a number of ways. For example, it is
reasonable to speculate that those who dropped out of treatment may have done so
because they realised that the treatment was not benefiting them. If this were the
case, it would have biased the remaining sample of patients so that those who were
included in the study were more likely to be treatment responders. This would have
had the consequence of restricting the variance in the measures of treatment
outcome, and generally made it more difficult to find factors that were significantly
associated with these measures. This supposition is impossible to test retrospectively.
However, one possible solution to this problem, were the study to be repeated, is to
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attempt to collect outcome measures from those who dropped out of treatment at
around the same time point as those who continued with treatment were completing
the programme.
Another way in which the loss of study participants may have affected the study is if
those who dropped out, or who didn't complete the study measures, were individuals
whose scores on the measures of dysfunctional schemata differed from those who
took part in the study. Young's model, of how these dysfunctional schemata operate,
suggests mechanisms through which this bias in the sample might potentially have
come about. Young (1990) describes three sets of, what he calls, schema processes.
These processes are styles of coping that have theoretical links with psychoanalytic
concepts such as resistance and defence mechanisms. Two of these might be
particularly relevant for understanding why some individuals, with strongly held
beliefs from the schema domains, might not complete all aspects of their treatment.
One of these processes is 'schema avoidance'. It refers to the individual's attempts to
prevent the painful schema being triggered by avoiding situations where this is likely
to happen. He gives the example of a patient with a 'Failure' schema, who avoids
starting on a project because they believe that they might receive a poor evaluation
(Young and Behary, 1998). Another process described by Young is 'schema
maintenance'. This is where individuals give full rein to their schemata, but this
process ultimately involves these beliefs being reinforced. Young and Behary (1998)
give the example of a patient with the 'Defectiveness' schema who selects a partner
who is critical and demeaning of them, thereby reinforcing their belief that they are
unlovable and flawed.
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Examples of how these schema processes that might have been at work in this
sample follow next. The first of these involves holding the belief that others are
unreliable (this is hypothesised to be a part of the Disconnection/Rejection schema
domain). This may lead patients to mistrust their therapists and to be wary of other
patients in the group. This distrust may lead them to drop out of treatment or to doubt
the motives of those who ask them to complete questionnaires. It could also be
argued that those patients who hold the belief that they must not make any mistakes
(hypothesised to be part of the 'Overvigilance/ Inhibition' schema domain of the
YSQ-SF and also part of the 'Achievement' attitudes of the DAS) might also drop out
of treatment. Such individuals may, for example, find it difficult to tolerate a
treatment situation where there is the potential for their mistakes to be exposed
publicly and who would rather forgo treatment than run this risk. Similarly, it could
be argued that these individuals might also be reluctant to complete questionnaires,
also because they fear making mistakes. Those patients that score highly on the
schema domain that Young calls 'Impaired Limits' may also be more likely to drop
out of treatment. This is best illustrated by reference to a specific item from this
schema domain. Item 72 (see Appendix X) has the statement, 'If I can't reach a goal I
become easily frustrated arid give up'. It could, therefore, be hypothesised that these
individuals would struggle with the slow progress that the pacing approach entails.
These same individuals might also not complete long and boring questionnaires (see
item 71 of the YSQ-SF). Finally, the belief that one should always be in control of
one's emotional responses (a belief that is a central part of the 'Self-control' attitudes
of the DAS measures) may also be relevant. Such a beliefmay make it difficult to
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tolerate the strong feelings that can be invoked during the group treatment process,
and may therefore make it more likely for such a person to drop out.
In some cases it was possible to examine these speculations. The Results section
(3.3) gives the outcome of a series of further analyses. These analyses set out to
examine the extent to which individuals who did not complete the treatment
programme, or who failed to complete all of the questionnaires, differed in terms of
their schemata from those who provided full data sets for the study. These results
suggested that there was little evidence for these hypothesised mechanisms.
Comparisons involving the three sets of YSQ schema domain measures (self-report,
informant-report and psychologist ratings) did not differ between those who
completed treatment and those who did not. Nor did they differ between those who
did and those who did not complete the outcome measures that were taken during the
final group session. However, there was one significant difference between those
who failed to complete YSQ-SF and those who did. Those who didn't complete this
measure were judged by the psychologists to be significantly higher in the 'Impaired
Limits' schema domain. It is possible to interpret this result as being in line with the
schema processes proposed by Young (1990). That is, having the belief that one is
incapable of completing boring tasks, such as completing a lengthy questionnaire,
may lead the individual to not attempt the questionnaire (schema avoidance), or to
attempt it and to then give up halfway through (schema maintenance).
The analyses involving the DAS sub-scales revealed two further significant
differences between 'completers' and 'non-completers'. However, both of these were
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in the direction opposite to that predicted. Those who provided a full set of outcome
measures for the study had significantly higher scores on the 'Achievement' and
'Self-control' sub-scales of the DAS than did those who failed to complete the end of
treatment measures. These two findings might not have been totally unexpected. A
post-hoc rationale might be that schema maintenance processes could work to ensure
that patients did complete all aspects of their treatment. For example, it might be
possible to reinterpret these results as showing that those who have strong
'Achievement' beliefs will complete every aspect of their treatment, as to do
otherwise might indicate to them that they have failed to keep to their own high
standards. Similarly, individuals who have strong beliefs about the importance of
self-control may continue with a treatment process that is making them
uncomfortable because to do otherwise would indicate to theme that they have failed
to maintain control over their feelings. These findings highlight how difficult it is to
predict the responses of individuals, who have certain schemata, in any given
situation.
Apart from the potential biases that could have been introduced by patients not
providing full data sets, there was another, possibly quite large, influence on the
study's outcome. Entry to the group programme is always preceded by an assessment
interview. In 1996, an audit of the pain management service where the research was
conducted found that the majority of patients (58 per cent) go straight to the group
programme (Stuckey, 1996). Twenty four per cent of patients were deemed to be
unsuitable for treatment or where uninterested in the treatment that was offered. The
remainder of the patients who were assessed (18 per cent of the total) were provided
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with an individual treatment programme. The analysis of the reasons why some
patients were allocated to individual, rather than group, treatment are worth noting.
Approximately five per cent of patients received individual treatment because of
'personality problems'. Another fifteen per cent had individual therapy because they
were anxious or depressed, and a further twenty two per cent because of unspecified
'psychological issues'. As will be clear from this breakdown, a significant number of
patients have psychological problems of one kind or another but, because they
receive an individual treatment programme, they do not join the pain management
groups.
This process means that the pain patients who received group treatment were a
selected sub-sample of all of those that were referred for treatment. This selection
process might have biased the study against finding significant effects of
dysfunctional schemata on patient outcomes. One way in which it might have done
this is if the patients who received individual treatment had higher levels of
dysfunctional schemata than those who received group treatment. It is reasonable to
suggest that this might have been the case, particularly as the audit of the pain
management service suggested that some patients with 'personality problems' were
offered individual, rather than group, treatment. Those who were selected out of
group treatment because of anxiety/depression or other 'psychological issues' may
also have had high levels of these schemata. The net effect of this selection process
might have been to make the group patients more homogeneous in terms of their
schemata. This reduction in the degree of variability in patients' schemata might have
hampered the chances of finding significant associations between these beliefs and
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the patients' outcomes. A future study might profit from including those patients who
had an individual programme along with those who had group treatment, in order to
examine whether this greater heterogeneity yields more support for the study
hypothesis.
Before concluding it is worth commenting on the methods by which dysfunctional
schemata were assessed in this study. This study was unusual because it did not just
rely on patient's own self-reports, rather it obtained reports from informants drawn
from the patient's social network and included ratings of these schemata made by
psychologists. This extra effort was made because there have been a number of
doubts raised about the validity of self-report questionnaires. In the Introduction, the
literature on self-enhancing biases in self-reports was discussed and prompted the
inclusion of informant reports. Others have suggested that questionnaire measures
can never accurately capture cognitive vulnerabilities to depression as they are often
too general and can be tainted by current mood states, such as dysphoria, happiness
or dissatisfaction (Andrews and Brown, 1993). As well as having these potential
problems, the design of the YSQ-SF raises other concerns. First of all is its length.
Although much shorter than the long-form, at 75 items it is still a long questionnaire.
When faced with the task of fdling it in, the patients, who were also being asked to
complete a number of other questionnaires as part of their treatment, may well have
been put off by the questionnaire's length. It is possible that the size of the YSQ-SF
may have dissuaded some potential study participants from taking part. Those who
did complete the YSQ-SF may easily have become bored or irritated by it and,
consequently, they may not have given it the same attention as they would have
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given to shorter questionnaires. Another factor is the structure of the questionnaire.
The questionnaire yields 15 schemata and five schema domains. Each schema score
is calculated from five items that are adjacent to each other (with the schema domain
scores being computed from various combinations of individual schema scores). That
is, the first schema score is calculated from the first five items, the next schema score
from the following five items, and so on. This organisation increases the chances that
the person filling in the YSQ-SF will quickly form an impression of what kind of
information the researcher is seeking. This may result in an individuals answers
being derived from some form of 'response set', whereby the content of particular
items may be ignored by the participant who may have generated their own ideas
about what the question is 'really' after. This problem may be compounded by the
fact that all of the items are phrased in same direction (that is, no items are scored
inversely). However, it should be pointed out that the alternative, where
questionnaires contain a mixture of positive and negatively valenced questions, can
cause confusion instead (Dunbar, Ford, Hunt and Derr, 2000). The fact that the
estimates of internal consistency for these schema scores are generally very good
may be evidence that they were generated as part of a 'response set'. If these
processes were taking place, it would have obscured the patients' true schemata,
making it less likely to find support for the study hypothesis. These concerns were
one reason why the DAS was employed alongside the YSQ-SF. At only 24 items it is
relatively short. Furthermore, the items representing the three sub-scales are
distributed throughout the questionnaire and some of them are scored inversely. As
the DAS did not perform any better than the YSQ-SF in predicting patients'
outcomes, it could be argued that it was not the design faults of the YSQ-SF that
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explain why the hypothesis failed. However, there is only a moderate degree of
conceptual overlap between the YSQ schema domains and the DAS sub-scales,
which leaves open the possibility that if the YSQ-SF had been a better instrument it
might have been more strongly related to patient outcome.
Ill
CONCLUSION
This study examined the hypothesis that dysfunctional schemata are associated with
variations in patients' outcomes from a pain management programme. The results
generally did not support the study hypothesis. Only four associations, out of a
possible 216, were statistically significant (at the adjusted alpha level) and only one
of these was in the direction predicted. In an attempt to counter various criticisms of
self-report measures of cognitive vulnerability, dysfunctional schemata were also
assessed through informant reports and clinical ratings. However, the results
produced by these different measures did not differ greatly.
Various explanations were put forward to explain the lack of support for the study
hypothesis. These explanations included suggestions that these dysfunctional
schemata might actually aid patients in their rehabilitation. It was also suggested that
scores on these measures of schemata might respond to the treatment provided by the
pain management programme in such a way as to reduce post-treatment variations
between patients. Various aspects of the study design were also examined as
potential sources of explanation for the null results. The sample size used in this
study was small. However, the average effect sizes produced by the study were small
and likely to be clinically unimportant. Furthermore, post-hoc power analyses
suggested that very large samples would have been required to detect the small
effects that were demonstrated here. A number of potential study participants were
not included in the final sample. This was because they either because they dropped-
out of treatment or because they did not complete all of the study measures. It was
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possible to conduct some analyses of the schema characteristics of these 'non-
completers'. This analysis suggested that they were similar to those who completed
the study and that this loss of participants was unlikely to be a major threat to the
study's conclusions. A more likely explanation is that the patients who receive group,
as opposed to individual, treatment, are selected on the basis that they have,
relatively, few psychological problems. This may have had the consequence of
increasing the homogeneity of the group patients, both in terms of their levels of
dysfunctional schemata and their outcome from treatment. A final threat to the study
was the use of the YSQ-SF as the main measures of dysfunctional schemata. This
measure was criticised for its simple structure that was felt to contain demand
characteristics that may have produced a response set that obscured the participant's
true schemata scores.
A number of suggestions were made to improve the design of the study, including
obtaining outcome measures from study drop-outs and 'non-completers', examining
the response of those patients who were provided with an individual pain
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Appendix I: NRS scale
We would appreciate you responding to the questions below and to the attached
questionnaires. This information will help us to understand more about your
experience ofchronic pain.
Please checkyou complete ALL questions on BOTH sides - Thankyou
1. Sex: Male Female (please circle)
2. How long have you experienced pain? (please circle)
Up to: 2 years
8 years
3. Do you currently receive benefits?







4. Are you currently working? (please circle)
Yes, full time paid work Yes, part time paid work Yes, doing voluntary work
No, because of pain No, not because of pain (eg. student, homemaker etc)
5. How many bad pain days have you had in the past week?
6. How intense has the pain been on average over the past week on a scale of 0 to 10
where 0 is not intense and 10 is extremely intense?
7. How distressing has the pain been on average over the past week on a scale of 0 to 10
where 0 is not distressing and 10 is extremely distressing?
k How many visits have you had to your GP in the past three months because of pain?
). How many emergency call outs to your GP have you had in the past three months because of pain?
0. Do you have any ongoing legal proceedings which are related to your chronic pain?
Yes No (please circle)
1. Are you currently living alone? Yes No (please circle)
xi
Appendix II: • FAIN: S-E QUESTIONNAIRE APPENDIX-E
Self-Efficacy scale MKN (1988) Pain Management Centre
St Thomas' Hospital London.
NAME: 1 DATE
Please rate how confident you are that you can do the following things at present,
despite the pain. To answer circle one of the numbers on the scale under each
item, where 0 = "Not at all confident" and 6 = "Completely confident"
FOR EXAMPLE:-
0 1 2 Q) 4_ 5 6_
Not at all Completely
Confident Confident
Remember, this questionnaire is not asking whether or not you have been doing
these things, but rather, how confident you are that you can do them at the
present, desoite the oain.
1) I can still enjoy things, despite the pain.
0 I :2 3 4 5 6
Not at all Completely
Confident Confident
2) I can still do most of the household chores (e.g. tidying up, washing
dishes etc.) despite the pain.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Not at all Completely
Confident Confident
3) I can socialise with my friends or family members as often as I used to,
despite the pain.
0 I 2 3 4 5_ 6
Not at all Completely
Confident Confident
4) I can cope v/ith my pain in most situations.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
No: at all Completely
Confident Confident
5) I can do some sort of work, despite the pain
("Work" includes housework, paid or unpaid work)
0 ~ 1 2 3 4 5 6
Not at all Completely
Confident Confident
Turn over the pa^c.
6) I can still do many of the things I enjoy doing, such as hobbies or








































tions: This questionnaire consists of 21 groups of statements. Please read each group of statements carefully, and
:k out the one statement in each group that best describes the way you have been feeling during the past two
including today. Circle the number beside the statement you have picked. If several statements in the group
apply equally well, circle the highest number for that group. Be sure that you do not choose more than one
nt for any group, including Item 16 (Changes in Sleeping Pattern) or Item 18 (Changes in Appetite).
dness
I do not feel sad.
I feel sad much of the time.
I am sad all the time.
I am so sad or unhappy that I can't stand it.
ssimism
I am not discouraged about my future.
I feel more discouraged about my future than I
used to be.
I do not expect things to work out for me.
I feel my future is hopeless and will only get
worse.
st Failure
I do not feel like a failure.
I have failed more than I should have.
As I look back, I see a lot of failures.
I feel I am a total failure as a person.
;s of Pleasure
I get as much pleasure as I ever did from the
things I enjoy.
I don't enjoy things as much as I used to.
I get very little pleasure from the things I used
to enjoy.
I can't get any pleasure from the things I used
to enjoy.
Ity Feelings
I don't feel particularly guilty.
I feel guilty over many things I have done or
should have done.
I feel quite guilty most of the time.
I feel guilty all of the time.
6. Punishment Feelings
0 I don't feel I am being punished.
1 I feel I may be punished.
2 I expect to be punished.
3 I feel I am being punished.
7. Self-Dislike
0 I feel the same about myself as ever.
1 I have lost confidence in myself.
2 I am disappointed in myself.
3 I dislike myself.
8. Self-Criticalness
0 I don't criticize or blame myself more than usual.
1 I am more critical of myself than I used to be.
2 I criticize myself for all ofmy faults.
3 I blame myself for everything bad that happens.
9. Suicidal Thoughts or Wishes
0 I don't have any thoughts of killing myself.
1 I have thoughts of killing myself, but I would
not carry them out.
2 I would like to kill myself.
3 I would kill myself if I had the chance.
10. Crying
0 I don't cry anymore than I used to.
1 I cry more than I used to.
2 I cry over every little thing.
3 I feel like crying, but I can't.
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I am no more restless or wound up than usual.
I feel more restless or wound up than usual.
I am so restless or agitated that it's hard to stay
still.
I am so restless or agitated that I have to keep
moving or doing something.
)ss of Interest
I have not lost interest in other people or
activities.
I am less interested in other people or things
than before.
I have lost most ofmy interest in other people
or things.
It's hard to get interested in anything.
17. Irritability
0 I am no more irritable than usual.
1 I am more irritable than usual.
2 I am much more irritable than usual.
3 I am irritable all the time.
18. Changes in Appetite
0 I have not experienced any change in my
appetite.
la My appetite is somewhat less than usual,
lb My appetite is somewhat greater than usual.
2a My appetite is much less than before.
2b My appetite is much greater than usual.
3a I have no appetite at all.
3b I crave food all the time.
decisiveness
I make decisions about as well as ever.
I find it more difficult to make decisions than
usual.
I have much greater difficulty in making
decisions than I used to.
I have trouble making any decisions,
irthlessness
I do not feel I am worthless.
I don't consider myself as worthwhile and useful
as I used to.
I feel more worthless as compared to other
people.
I feel utterly worthless,
s of Energy
I have as much energy as ever.
I have less energy than I used to have.
I don't have enough energy to do very much.
I don't have enough energy to do anything.
nges in Sleeping Pattern
I hgve not experienced any change in my
sleeping pattern.
I sleep somewhat more than usual.
I sleep somewhat less than usual.
[ sleep a lot more than usual.
[ sleep a lot less than usual.
[ sleep most of the day.
! wake up 1-2 hours early and can't get back
o sleep. _
19. Concentration Difficulty
0 I can concentrate as well as ever.
1 I can't concentrate as well as usual.
2 It's hard to keep my mind on anything for
very long.
3 I find I can't concentrate on anything.
20. Tiredness or Fatigue
0 I am no more tired or fatigued than usual.
1 I get more tired or fatigued more easily than
usual.
2 I am too tired or fatigued to do a lot of the things
I used to do.
3 I am too tired or fatigued to do most of the
things I used to do.
21. Loss of Interest in Sex
0 I have not noticed any recent change in my
interest in sex.
1 I am less interested in sex than I used to be.
2 I am much less interested in sex now.








Below is a list of common symptoms of anxiety. Please read each item in the list carefully. Indicate
how much you have been bothered by each symptom during the PAST WEEK, INCLUDING TODAY
by placing an X in the corresponding space in the column next to each symptom.












1 Numbness or tingling
2 Feeling hot
3 Wobbliness in legs
4 Unable to relax
5 Fear of the worst happening
6 Dizzy or lightheaded




1 Feelings of choking
2 Hands trembling
3 Shaky
4 Fear of losing control
5 Difficulty breathing
6 Fear of dying
7 Scared








This questionnaire is to help us better understand the way you view your pain problems.
Each statement describes how you may feel about this particular problem. Please indicate the extent to
which you tend to agree or disagree with each statement. In each example, please make your choice on
how you feel right now, not how you have felt in the past or how you would like to feel.
Circle the response that best describes how much you agree or disagree with each statement.
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree
1. I have been thinking that the way I cope with my pain could improve. 1 2 3 4 5
2. I am developing new ways to cope with my pain. 1 2 3 4 5
3. I have learned some good ways to keep my pain problem from interfering
with my life. 1 2 3 4 5
4. When my pain flares up, I find myself automatically using coping strategies
that have worked in the past, such as relaxation exercise or mental distraction
technique. 1 2 3 4 5
5. I am using some strategies that help me better deal with my pain problem on
a day to day basis. 1 2 3 4 5
5. I have started to come up with strategies to help myself control my pain. 1 2 3 4 5
7. I have recently realised that there is no medical cure for my pain condition,
so I want to learn some ways to cope with it. 1 2 3 4 5
!. Even ifmy pain doesn't go away, I am ready to start changing how I deal
with it. 1 2 3 4 5
'. I realise now that it is time for me to come up with a better plan to cope
with my pain problem. 1 2 3 4 5
0. I use what I have learned to keep my pain under control. 1 2 3 4 5
1. I have tried everything that people have recommended to manage my pain
and nothing helps. 1 2 3 4 5
2. My pain is a medical problem and I should be dealing with physicians
about it. 1 2 3 4 5
3.1 am currently-using some suggestions people have made about how to live
with my pain problem. 1 2 3 4 5
4. I am beginning to wonder if I need to get some help to develop skills for
dealing with my pain. 1 2 3 4 5
xvii
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree
15.1 have recently figured out that it is up to me to deal better with my pain. 1 2 3 4 5
16. Everybody I speak with tells me that I have to learn to live with my pain,
but I don't see why I should have to. 1 2 3 4 5
17.1 have incorporated strategies for dealing with my pain into my everyday life. 1 2 3 4 5
18.1 have made a lot of progress in coping with my pain. 1 2 3 4 5
19.1 have recently come to the conclusion that it's time for me to change how
I cope with my pain. 1 2 3 4 5
20. I'm getting help learning some strategies for coping better with my pain. 1 2 3 4 5
21. I'm starting to wonder whether it's up to me to manage my pain rather
than relying on physicians. 1 2 3 4 5
22.1 still think despite what doctors tell me, there must be some surgical
procedure or medication that would get rid ofmy pain. 1 2 3 4 5
23.1 have been thinking that doctors can only help so much in managing my
pain and that the rest is up to me. 1 2 3 4 5
24. The best thing I can do is find a doctor who can figure out how to get rid
ofmy pain for once and for all. 1 2 3 4 5
25. Why can't someone just do something to take away my pain? 1 2 3 4 5
26.1 am learning to help myself control my pain without doctors. 1 2 3 4 5
27. I am testing out some coping skills to manage my pain better. 1 2 3 4 5
18.1 have been wondering if there is something I could do to manage my
pain better. 1 2 3 4 5
19. All of this talk about how to cope better is a waste of time 1 2 3 4 5
0. I am learning ways to control my pain other than with medications or surgery. 1 2 3 4 5
xviii
Appendix VI: Physical functioning report sheet
PHYSIOTHERAPY ASSESSMENT
NAME:





A - Easy A
B -Minimum B
C - Moderate C
D - Severe D














A - Easy A
3 -Minimum B





A - Easy A
B -Minimum B
C - Moderate C
D - Extreme D




PAIN QUESTIONNAIRE (R & M SIP)
Name Date
When you are in pain you may find it difficult to do some of the things you normally do.
This list contains some sentences that people have used to describe themselves when they are in pain. When
you read them you may find that some stand out because they describe over the past few days you over the
past few days including today. As you read the list, think of yourself. When you read a sentence that
describes you put a tick against it. If the sentence does not describe you then leave the spact^blank and move
onto the next orre. Remember only to tick the sentence if you are sure that it describes how you have been
recently.
1. I stay at home most of the time because ofmy pain.
2. I change position frequently to try and get comfortable.
3. I walk more slowly than usual because ofmy pain.
4. Because ofmy pain I am not doing any of the jobs that I usually do around the house.
5. Because ofmy pain I use a handrail to get upstairs.
6. Because ofmy pain I lie down to rest more often.
7. Because ofmy pain I have to hold on to something to get out of an easy chair.
8. Because ofmy pain I try to get other people to do things for me.
9. I get dressed more slowly than usual because ofmy pain.
10. I only stand up for short periods of time because ofmy pain.
11. Because ofmy pain I try not to bend or kneel down.
12. I find it difficult to get out of a chair because ofmy pain.
13. I find it difficult to turn over in bed because ofmy pain.
14. My appetite is not very good because ofmy pain.
15. I have trouble putting on my socks (stockings/tights) because ofmy pain.
16. I only walk short distances because ofmy pain.
17. I sleep less well because ofmy pain.
18. Because ofmy pain I get dressed with help from someone else.
19. I sit down for most of the day because ofmy pain.
20. I avoid heavy jobs around the house because ofmy pain.
21. Because ofmy pain I am more irritable and bad tempered with people than usual.
22. Because ofmy pain I go upstairs more slowly than usual.
23. 1 stay in bed most of the time because ofmy pain.





This is a list of phrases which other patients have used to express how they view their condition.






1) I'm afraid that I might injure myself if I exercise 0 12 3
2) If I were to try to overcome it, my pain would increase 0 12 3
3) My body is telling me I have something dangerously
wrong 0 12 3
4] My pain would probably be relieved if I were to exercise 0 12 3
5) People aren't taking my medical condition seriously
enough 0 12 3
6) My accident has put my body at risk for the rest ofmy
life 0 12 3
7) Pain always means I have injured my body 0 12 3
8] Just because something aggravates my pain does not
mean it is dangerous 0 12 3
9) I am afraid that I might injure myself accidentally 0 12 3
10) Simply being careful that I do not make any unnecessary
movements is the safest thing I can do to prevent my
pain from worsening 0 12 3
11) I wouldn't have this much pain if there wasn't something
potentially dangerous going on in my body 0 12 3
12] Although my condition is painful, I would be better off if
I were physically active 0 12 3
13) Pain lets me know when to stop exercising so that I don't
injure myself 0 12 3
14) It's really not safe for a person with a condition like mine
to be physically active 0 12 3
15) I can't do all the things normal people do because it's too
easy for me to get injured 0 12 3
16] Even though something is causing me a lot of pain, I
don't think it's actually dangerous 0 12 3






Listed below are statements that a person might use to describe himself or herself. Please read each
statement and decide how well it describes you. When there you are not sure, base your answer on
what you emotionally feel, not on what you think to be true. Choose the highest rating from 1 to 6
that describes you and write the number in the space before the statement.
RATING SCALE:
1 = Completely untrue of me
2 = Mostly untrue of me
3 = Slightly more true than untrue
4 = Moderately true of me
5 = Mostly true of me
6 = Describes me perfectly1. Most of the time, I haven't had someone to nurture me, share him/herself with me, or care
deeply about everything that happens to me.2. In general, people have not been there to give me warmth, holding, and affection.3. For much of my life, I haven't felt that I am special to someone.4. For the most part, I have not had someone who really listens to me, understands me, or is
tuned into my true needs and feelings.5. I have rarely had a strong person to give me sound advice or direction when I'm not sure
what to do.6. I find myself clinging to people I'm close to, because I'm afraid they'll leave me.7. I need other people so much that I worry about losing them.8. I worry that people I feel close to will leave me or abandon me.9. When I feel someone I care for pulling away from me, I get desperate.10. Sometimes I am so worried about people leaving me that I drive them away.11. I feel that people will take advantage of me.12. I feel that I cannot let my guard down in the presence of other people, or else they will
intentionally hurt me.13. It is only a matter of time before someone betrays me.14. I am-quite suspicious of other people's motives.15. I'm usually on the lookout for people's ulterior motives.
xxii
16. I don't fit in.17. I'm fundamentally different from other people.18. I don't belong; I'm a loner.19. I feel alienated from other people.20. I always feel on the outside of groups.21. No man/woman I desire could love me one he/she saw my defects.22. No one I desire would want to stay close to me if he/she knew the real me.23. I'm unworthy of the love, attention, and respect of others.24. I feel that I'm not loveable.25. I am too unacceptable in very basic ways to reveal myself to other people. *ds26. Almost nothing I do at work (or school) is as good as other people can do.27. I'm incompetent when it comes to achievement.28. Most other people are more capable than I am in areas of work and achievement.29. I'm not as talented as most people are at their work.30. I'm not as intelligent as most people when it comes to work (or school).31. I do not feel capable of getting by on my own in everyday life.32. I think of myself as a dependent person, when it comes to everyday functioning.33. I lack common sense.34. My judgement cannot be relied upon in everyday situations.35. I don't feel confident about my ability to solve everyday problems that come up.36. I can't seem to escape the feeling that something bad is about to happen.37. I feel that a disaster (natural, criminal, financial, or medical) could strike at any moment.38. I worry about being attacked.39. I worry that I'll lose all my money and become destitute.40. I worry that I'm developing a serious illness, even though nothing serious has been
diagnosed by a physician.41. I have not been able to separate myself from my parent(s), the way other people my age
seem to. —42. My parent(s) and I tend to be over-involved in each other's lives and problems.
43. It is very difficult for my parent(s) and me to keep intimate details from each other, without
feeling betrayed or guilty.44. I often feel as if my parent(s) are living through me-l don't have a life of my own.45. I often feel that I do not have a separate identity from my parent(s) or partner.46. I think that if I do what I want, I'm only asking for trouble.47. I feel that I have no choice but to give in to other people's wishes, or else they will retaliate
or reject me in some way.48. In relationships, I let the other person have the upper hand.49. I've always let others make choices for me, so I really don't know what I want for myself.50. I have a lot of trouble demanding that my rights be respected and that my feelings be taken
into account.51. I'm the one who usually ends up taking care of the people I'm close to.52. I am a good person because I think of others more than of myself.53. I'm so busy doing for the people that I care about, that I have little time for myself.54. I've always been the one who listens to everyone else's problems.55. Other people see me as doing too much for others and not enough for myself.56. I am too self-conscious to show positive feelings to others (e.g., affection, showing I care).57. I find it embarrassing to express my feelings to others.58. I find it hard to be warm and spontaneous.59. I control myself so much that people think I am unemotional.60. People see me as uptight emotionally.61. I must be the best at most of what I do; I can't accept second best.62. I try to do my best; I can't settle for "good enough."63. I must meet all my responsibilities.64. I feel there is constant pressure for me to achieve and get things done.65. I can't let myself off the hook easily or make excuses for my mistakes.66. I have a lot of trouble accepting "no" for an answer when I want something from other
people.67. I'm special and shouldn't have to accept many of the restrictions placed on other people.68. I hate to be constrained or kept from doing what I want.
xxiv
69. I feel that I shouldn't have to follow the normal rules and conventions other people do.70. I feel that what I have to offer is of greater value than the contributions of others.71. I can't seem to discipline myself to complete routine or boring tasks.72. If I can't reach a goal, I become easily frustrated and give up.73. I have a very difficult time sacrificing immediate gratification to achieve a long-range goal.74. I can't force myself to do things I don't enjoy, even when I know it's for my own good.75. I have rarely been able to stick to my resolutions.
COPYRIGHT 1999 Jeffrey Young, Ph.D., and Gary Brown, Ph.D. Unauthorised reproduction
without written consent of the authors is prohibited. For more information, write: Cognitive
Therapy Center of New York, 120 East 56th Street, Suite 530, New York, NY 10022





Listed below are statements that a person might use to describe himself or herself. Please
read each statement and decide how well it describes the person who gave vou this form.
When there you are not sure, base your answer on what you emotionally feel, not on what
you think to be true of them. Choose the highest rating from 1 to 6 that describes the
person that gave vou this form and write the number in the space before the statement.
Remember, vou are filling in this questionnaire as if vou were the person who gave vou this
form.
RATING SCALE:
1 = Completely untrue of me
2 = Mostly untrue of me
3 = Slightly more true than untrue
4 = Moderately true of me
5 = Mostly true of me
6 = Describes me perfectly1. Most of the time, I haven't had someone to nurture me, share him/herself with me,
or care deeply about everything that happens to me.2. In general, people have not been there to give me warmth, holding, and affection.3. For much of my life, I haven't felt that I am special to someone.4. For the most part, I have not had someone who really listens to me, understands
me, or is tuned into my true needs and feelings.5. I have rarely had a strong person to give me sound advice or direction when I'm not
sure what to do.6. I find myself clinging to people I'm close to, because I'm afraid they'll leave me.7. I need other people so much that I worry about losing them.8. I worry that people I feel close to will leave me or abandon me.9. When I feel someone I care for pulling away from me, I get desperate.10. Sometimes I am so worried about people leaving me that I drive them away.11. I feel that people will take advantage of me.
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12. I feel that I cannot let my guard down in the presence of other people, or else they will
intentionally hurt me.13. It is only a matter of time before someone betrays me.14. I am quite suspicious of other people's motives.15. I'm usually on the lookout for people's ulterior motives.16. I don't fit in.17. I'm fundamentally different from other people.18. I don't belong; I'm a loner.19. I feel alienated from other people.20. I always feel on the outside of groups.21. No man/woman I desire could love me one he/she saw my defects.22. No one I desire would want to stay close to me if he/she knew the real me.23. I'm unworthy of the love, attention, and respect of others.24. I feel that I'm not loveable.25. I am too unacceptable in very basic ways to reveal myself to other people.26. Almost nothing I do at work (or school) is as good as other people can do.27. I'm incompetent when it comes to achievement.28. Most other people are more capable than I am in areas of work and achievement.29. I'm not as talented as most people are at their work.30. I'm not as intelligent as most people when it comes to work (or school).31. I do not feel capable of getting by on my own in everyday life.32. I think of myself as a dependent person, when it comes to everyday functioning.33. I lack common sense.34. My judgement cannot be relied upon in everyday situations.35. I don't feel confident about my ability to solve everyday problems that come up.36. I can't seem to escape the feeling that something bad is about to happen.37. I feel that a disaster (natural, criminal, financial, or medical) could strike at any moment.
38.
_____ I worry about being attacked.39. I worry that I'll lose all my money and become destitute.
40. I worry that I'm developing a serious illness, even though nothing serious has been
diagnosed by a physician.41. I have not been able to separate myself from my parent(s), the way other people my age
seem to.42. My parent(s) and I tend to be over-involved in each other's lives and problems.43. It is very difficult for my parent(s) and me to keep intimate details from each other, without
feeling betrayed or guilty.44. I often feel as if my parent(s) are living through me-l don't have a life of my own.45. I often feel that I do not have a separate identity from my parent(s) or partner.46. I think that if I do what I want, I'm only asking for trouble.47. I feel that I have no choice but to give in to other people's wishes, or else they will retaliate
or reject me in some way.48. In relationships, I let the other person have the upper hand.49. I've always let others make choices for me, so I really don't know what I want for myself.50. I have a lot of trouble demanding that my rights be respected and that my feelings be taken
into account.51. I'm the one who usually ends up taking care of the people I'm close to.52. I am a good person because I think of others more than of myself.53. I'm so busy doing for the people that I care about, that I have little time for myself.54. I've always been the one who listens to everyone else's problems.55. Other people see me as doing too much for others and not enough for myself.56. I am too self-conscious to show positive feelings to others (e.g., affection, showing I care).57. I find it embarrassing to express my feelings to others.58. I find it hard to be warm and spontaneous.59. I control myself so much that people think I am unemotional.60. People see me as uptight emotionally.61. I must be the best at most of what I do; I can't accept second best.62. I try to do my best; I can't settle for "good enough."63. I must meet all my responsibilities.64. I feel there is constant pressure for me to achieve and get things done.65. I can't let myself off the hook easily or make excuses for my mistakes.
xxviii
66. I have a lot of trouble accepting "no" for an answer when I want something from other
people.67. I'm special and shouldn't have to accept many of the restrictions placed on other people.68. I hate to be constrained or kept from doing what I want.69. I feel that I shouldn't have to follow the normal rules and conventions other people do.70. I feel that what I have to offer is of greater value than the contributions of others.71. I can't seem to discipline myself to complete routine or boring tasks.72. If I can't reach a goal, I become easily frustrated and give up.73. I have a very difficult time sacrificing immediate gratification to achieve a long-range goal.74. I can't force myself to do things I don't enjoy, even when I know it's for my own good.75. I have rarely been able to stick to my resolutions.
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Appendix XI Psychologist ratings
Instructions. Read each of the statements carefully and for each one circle the number that
best describes the person you are rating
1. This person has an expectation that their needs for security, safety, stability, nurturance,
empathy, sharing of feelings, acceptance, and respect will not be met in a predictable manner.
very much so somewhat a little not at all don't know
1 2 3 4 9
2. This person feels that they cannot manage on their own, that they will fail if they try, and
feel that something awful is likely to happen to them at any moment.
very much so somewhat a little not at all don't know
1 2 3 4 9
3. This person feels a sense of superiority, entitlement and has a belief that they should be
able to do what they want regardless of what is realistic or reasonable. May also have a
difficulty exercising self-control and is likely not to tolerate frustrations easily.
very much so somewhat a little not at all don't know
1 2 3 4 9
4. This person has an excessive focus on the desires, feelings, and responses of others, at the
expense of their own needs - in order to gain love and approval, to maintain their sense of
connection or to avoid retaliation. This person may also show a lack of awareness, or
suppression of, their anger.
very much so somewhat a little not at all don't know
1 2 3 4 9
5. This person has an excessive emphasis on controlling their own spontaneous feelings,
impulses, and choices in order to avoid making mistakes OR on meeting rigid, internalised
rules and expectations about performance and ethical behaviour - often at the expense of
happiness, self-expression, relaxation, close relationships or health.
very much so somewhat a little not at all don't know
1 2 3 4 9
XXX
Outcome rating
Instructions: Please give a rating on the scale below indicating what you consider to be the
likely outcome from the pain management programme for this individual,
very poor very good
outcome outcome




This scale lists different attitudes or beliefs which people sometimes hold. Please read
each statement carefully and decide how much you agree or disagree with what it says.
For each of the attitudes, please indicate you answer by placing a tick (*^) under the
column that best describes how you think. Be sure to choose only one answer for each
attitude. But please note that because people are different, there is no right or wrong
answer to these statements.
To decide whether a given answer is typical of your way of looking at things, simply keep
















1. If I fail partly, it is as bad
as being a complete
failure
2. If others dislike you, you
cannot be happy
3. I should be happy all
the time
4. People will probably
think less of me if I make a
mistake
5. My happiness depends
more on other people than
it does on me
6. I should always have
complete control over my
feelings
7. My life is wasted unless
I am a success
8. What other people think
of me is very important
9. I ought to be able to
solve my problems quickly
and without a great deal of
effort
10. If I don't set the
highest standards for
myself I am likely to end
up a second rate person
11. I am nothing if a


















2. A person should be
ole to control what
appens to him/her
3. If 1 am to be a
orthwhile person, 1 must
e truly outstanding in at
ast one major respect
4. If you don't have
thers to lean on, you are
Dund to be sad
5. It is possible for a
arson to be scolded and
at get upset
3. 1 must be a useful,
"oductive, creative
arson or life has no
jrpose
7. 1 can find happiness
ithout being loved by
aother person
3. A person should do
ell at everything he/she
idertakes
3. If 1 do not do well all
e time, people will not
spect me
). 1 do not need the
aproval of others in order
be happy
. If 1 try hard enough, 1
ould be able to excel at
'erything 1 attempt
!. People who have good
aas are more worthy
an those who do not
i. A person doesn't need
be well liked in order to
happy
. Whenever 1 take a
ance or risk 1 am only
aking for trouble
Thank you for filling in this questionnaire
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I am writing to invite you to join a research study that is being undertaken in
connection with the Lothian Chronic Pain Service, based in the Clinical Psychology
Department at the Astley Ainslie Hospital. The attached Information sheet explains
what the project is about. Please read this sheet carefully and if you are interested in
taking part please remember to complete the consent form. It is very important to the
success of the research project that as many people as possible take part. Therefore, I





Appendix XIV: Consent form (patient)




for a study into how thinking affects pain management
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide it is
important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will
involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it
with friends, relatives and your GP if you wish. Ask us if there is anything that is not
clear or if you would like more information. Take time to decide whether or not you
wish to take part.
Consumers for Ethics in Research (CERES) publish a leaflet entitled 'Medical
Research and You'. This leaflet gives more information about medical research and
looks at some questions you may want to ask. A copy may be obtained from
CERES, PO Box 1365, London N16 OBW.
Thank you for reading this.
What is the purpose of the study?
It is accepted by many people that the way that we think can affect the level of pain
we experience, how we cope with it and how fed up pain can make us feel. Indeed,
the pain management programme that you are about to start has two sessions on
thinking and how thoughts can affect mood and activity. It's obviously true that
different people look at things in different ways. For example, some see life as a
challenge, others see it as a series of hurdles. This study is an attempt to look at
these kinds of different styles of thinking and how they might be related to the
benefits that people get out of pain management.
This piece of research will be running for a six month period between January and
July 2001. However, if you choose to take part your personal involvement will only
be very brief.
Why have I been chosen?
You have been chosen because you are about to start the pain management
programme at the Astley Ainslie Hospital. All patients between January and July
2001 will be invited to take part in this study. Approximately 80 people will be taking
part.
Do I have to take part?
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part you
will be given this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent form. If
you decide to take part you are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a
reason. This will not affect the standard of care you receive.
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What will I be asked to do if I take part?
If you decide to take part in this study all you need to do is fill out the two
questionnaires that accompany this letter and bring them with you when you start the
pain management programme. You will also be asked to give a copy of one of the
questionnaires (the one labelled YSQ-SF) to a friend or family member who knows
you really well. They will be asked to fill in the questionnaire as if they were vou. The
reason they are asked to do this is because we are interested in whether a person's
family or friends see them in the same way that a person sees themselves. If you
agree to do this you will find this questionnaire in the envelope labelled 'friend or
family member' along with a letter addressed to them explaining what they would be
asked to do. We would also ask you not to discuss how you filled in the
questionnaire with them, otherwise it defeats the purpose of getting someone else to
fill it in. One thing that should be made very clear is that your answers and the
answers given by your friend or family member are completely confidential. That is,
no one apart from the researcher will know what answers you have given.
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part?
The only disadvantage of taking part will be the time taken to fill in the
questionnaires.
What are the possible benefits of taking part?
There will be no benefit to you personally from taking part. Hopefully, the information
that you provide will enable more effective pain management programmes to be
developed in the future.
What happens when the research study stops?
Once you have completed these questionnaires, and asked your friend or family
member to complete the questionnaire that they were asked to do, then your
involvement with the project would stop. However, if you would like to have some
feedback on the outcome of the study then you could tell the person leading the
group that you are in to contact me and I would send you the information when the
study was completed. The feedback, however, will just be general and would not be
specifically about you.
What if something goes wrong?
if you wish to complain about any aspect of the way you have been approached or
treated during the course of this study, the normal National Health Service
complaints mechanisms are available to you.
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential?
All information which is collected about you during the course of the research will be
kept strictly confidential. Any information about you which leaves the
hospital/surgery will have your name and address removed so that you cannot be
recognised from it.
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The consultant who is responsible for your care will be notified of your participation in
this study. Your GP will not be notified.
What will happen to the results of the research study?
This study is being conducted as part of the degree of Doctor of Clinical Psychology
with the University of Edinburgh. As a result it will be written up as a thesis and
submitted for examination. It is also likely that the study will be written up and
submitted to a scientific journal for publication. If it were to be published it would
occur within twelve months of the study being completed and you would be able to
access a copy of the completed article through the National Library.
Who is organising and funding the research?
This study is organised with assistance from Edinburgh University's Department of
Clinical Psychology and the Clinical Psychology service at the Astley Ainslie
Hospital.
Who has reviewed the study?
This study has been considered by the Research Ethics Committee for Lothian
region.
Contact for Further Information
If you require any further information regarding this project, or if you have any
questions about it, you can contact:
Martin Dunbar
Trainee Clinical Psychologist
Department of Clinical Psychology
Astley Ainslie Hospital
Edinburgh
Tel: 0131 537 9130
Local independent adviser
You can also contact an independent psychologist who has agreed to give you
impartial advice about the study. Her name is:
Gabby Wynne
Counselling Psychologist
Department of Clinical Psychology
Astley Ainslie Hospital
Edinburgh
Tel: 0131 537 9148
This Patient Information Sheet is yours to keep. If you agree to participate you





Title of Project: How thinking affects pain management
Name of Researcher: Martin Dunbar
Please initial box
□1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet dated 26 November 2000
for the above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions.
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time,
without giving any reason, without my medical care or legal rights being affected.
□
3. I understand that sections of any of my medical notes may be looked at by Martin
Dunbar, where it is relevant to my taking part in this research. I give permission for him to have
access to my records.
□
4. I agree to take part in the above study. □
Name of Patient Date Signature
Name of Person taking consent Date Signature
(if different from researcher)
Researcher Date Signature
1 for patient; 1 for researcher; 1 to be kept with hospital notes
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Appendix XV: Consent form (informant)
Information sheet and consent form for
friend/relative of participants (PMP patients)
INFORMATION SHEET
for a study into how thinking affects pain management
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide it is
important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will
involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it
with friends, relatives and your GP if you wish. Ask us if there is anything that is not
clear or if you would like more information. Take time to decide whether or not you
wish to take part.
Consumers for Ethics in Research (CERES) publish a leaflet entitled 'Medical
Research and You'. This leaflet gives more information about medical research and
looks at some questions you may want to ask. A copy may be obtained from
CERES, PO Box 1365, London N16 OBW.
Thank you for reading this.
What is the purpose of the study?
It is accepted by many people that the way that we think can affect the level of pain
we experience, how we cope with it and how fed up pain can make us feel. Indeed,
the pain management programme that your friend or relative is about to start has two
sessions on thinking and how thoughts can affect mood and activity. It's obviously
true that different people look at things in different ways. For example, some see life
as a challenge others see it as a series of hurdles. This study is an attempt to look at
these kinds of different styles of thinking and how they might be related to the
benefits that people get out of pain management.
This piece of research will be running for a six month period between January and
July 2001. However, if you choose to take part your personal involvement will only be
very brief.
Why have I been chosen?
You have been chosen because the friend or relative who gave you this form and the
attached questionnaire is about to start the pain management programme at the
Astley Ainslie Hospital. All pain management programme patients who are starting
treatment between January and July 2001 will be invited to take part in this study and
each one of them has been asked to nominate a friend or relative to fill in a
questionnaire. Approximately 80 people will be taking part. It is important that you
understand that the questionnaire that you are being asked to complete is about your
friend or relative and that they, not you, are the focus of this study.
Do I have to take part?
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part you
will be given- this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent form. If
you decide to take part you are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a
reason. This will not affect the standard of care that your friend or relative receives.
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What will I be asked to do if I take part?
If you decide to take part in this study all you need to do is fill out the questionnaire
(titled YSQ-SF) and the consent form that accompanies this letter and post them
back to me (Martin Dunbar) in the pre-paid envelope that you will find with this letter.
You are asked to fill in the questionnaire as if you were the person who gave you it.
The reason you are asked to do this is because we are interested in whether a
person's family or friends see them in the same way that a person sees themselves.
We would also ask you not to discuss how you filled in the questionnaire with the
person who gave you the questionnaire, otherwise it defeats the purpose of getting
someone else to fill it in. One thing that should be made very clear is that your
answers are completely confidential. That is, no one apart from the researcher will
know what answers you have given.
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part?
The only disadvantage of taking part will be the time taken to fill in the
questionnaires.
What are the possible benefits of taking part?
There will be no benefit to yourself or to the person who gave you this questionnaire
from your taking part. Hopefully, the information that you provide will enable more
effective pain management programmes to be developed in the future.
What happens when the research study stops?
Once you have completed this questionnaire and returned it to us your involvement
with the project would stop. However, if you would like to have some feedback on the
outcome of the study then you could write to me at the address below and I would
send you the information when the study was completed. The feedback, however,
will just be general and would not be specifically about you or your friend/relative.
What if something goes wrong?
if you wish to complain about any aspect of the way you have been approached or
treated during the course of this study, the normal National Health Service
complaints mechanisms are available to you.
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential?
All information which is collected about you during the course of the research will be
kept strictly confidential. Any information about you will have your name and address
removed so that you cannot be recognised from it.
xlii
What will happen to the results of the research study?
This study is being conducted as part of the degree of Doctor of Clinical Psychology
with the University of Edinburgh. As a result it will be written up as a thesis and
submitted for examination. It is also likely that the study will be written up and
submitted to a scientific journal for publication. If it were to be published it would
occur within twelve months of the study being completed and you would be able to
access a copy of the completed article through the National Library.
Who is organising and funding the research?
This study is organised with assistance from Edinburgh University's Department of
Clinical Psychology and the Clinical Psychology service at the Astley Ainslie Hospital.
Who has reviewed the study?
This study has been considered by the Research Ethics Committee for Lothian
region.
Contact for Further Information
If you require any further information regarding this project, or if you have any
questions about it, you can contact:
Martin Dunbar
Trainee Clinical Psychologist
Department of Clinical Psychology
Astley Ainslie Hospital
Edinburgh
Tel: 0131 537 9140
Local independent adviser
You can also contact an independent psychologist who has agreed to give you
impartial advice about the study. Her name is:
Gabby Wynne
Counselling Psychologist
Department of Clinical Psychology
Astley Ainslie Hospital
Edinburgh
Tel: 0131 537 9140
This Information Sheet is yours to keep. If you agree to participate you will be





Title of Project: How thinking affects pain management
Name of Researcher: Martin Dunbar
Please initial box
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet dated 26 November 2000
for the above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions.
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time,
without giving any reason, without my medical care or legal rights being affected.
3. I agree to take part in the above study.
4. I understand that the research gathered for this study is about my friend/relative and
not about me.
Your Name Date Signature
Your Address
Name of Person taking consent Date Signature
(if different from researcher)
Researcher Date Signature














As you will recall, I wrote to you just as you were about to start the Pain Management
Programme at the Astley Ainslie Hospital. At that time I invited you to join a research study
that is being undertaken in connection with the Lothian Chronic Pain Service. I note from my
records that you have not yet returned the questionnaires that I sent to you. Of course, this
may be because you have decided not to take part in the study, and if this is the case, then
please accept my apologies for bothering you. On the other hand, you may have simply
forgotten to return the questionnaires. In which case I would request that you do so as soon as
possible as it is very important to the success of the study that most group member take part. I
have also enclosed new copies of the questionnaires in case these have been mislaid since I
first wrote to you.
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Key:1=collectedatim1,2-collectedti ,-C=changebetw ntima .






















































































































































































































































TableXVIIICorrelationmatrixofllthesch mav riables(con i ued) I-OD- IP-DR-IA-ILP OD-OIDA-AD-S I-OD10.17-0.04-0.02-0.030.06
0.14
-0.28
-0.05
-0.38
(24)
(22)
(22)
(22)
(22)
(22)
(24)
(24)
(24)
I-OI
1
-0.57'
-0.01
-0.08
-0.03
0.13
-0.12
-0.17
-0.13
(22)
(22)
(22)
(22)
(22)
(24)
(24)
(24)
P-DR
1
0.65"
0.32*
0.33*
0.18
-0.07
0.06
0.07
(53)
(53)
(53)
(53)
(25)
(25)
(25)
P-IA
1
0.03
0.42*
0.32*
0.09
0.13
0.14
(53)
(53)
(53)
(25)
(25)
(25)
P-IL
1
-0.10
-0.20
0.26
0.22
0.10
(53)
(53)
(25)
(25)
(31)
P-OD
1
0.70"
0.14
-0.04
0.34
(53)
(25)
(25)
(25)
P-OI
1
-0.08
-0.08
0.23
(25)
(25)
(25)
DA-A
1
0.67"
0.57"
(31)
(31)
DA-D
1
0.39* (31)
DA-S
1
